The microfinance disappointment: an explanation based on risk aversion
How to cite
Katreniak, Dagmara Celik; Moav, Omer; Neeman, Zvika; Khazanov, Alexey; Zoabi, Hosny. 2021. "The microfinance disappointment: an explanation based on risk aversion." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007461. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7461-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Recent research indicates that microcredit has not contributed significantly to poverty reduction. Take up of affordable credit by the poor for investment in businesses, education and health turned out to be very low. We argue that this can be explained by risk aversion when investment affects the probability of success of a risky project. Our model abstracts from fixed costs in the production technology, commonly
assumed in the existing literature. There are no imperfections in the loan market, and we abstract from assumptions about false beliefs by the poor regarding the production function or other behavioral assumptions. We hypothesize that to facilitate investment and thereby reduce poverty, policy should be aimed at reducing the risk faced by the poor.
In the experiment, we aim to test our theoretical findings empirically. We predict that while the distribution of the investment choices in the return game will be unimodal, in the probability game it should be bimodal, especially for the risk-averse individuals. Second, we predict that risk-averse agents should select a lottery with a higher probability of winning, rather than a lottery with the same probability but higher return. For that, we will ask participants to provide us with step-by-step investment decisions of five equal portions of their entire endowment. The participants will choose either to invest the portion into an investment with a higher chance of winning or into an investment with a higher return. We also predict that risk aversion goes hand-in-hand with respondents’ household income and will differ by gender.
Intervention
We show theoretically that neglecting affordable high return investment opportunities can be explained by risk aversion even in the absence of fixed costs and we plan to test this prediction empirically. In an online experiment, we first elicit participants’ risk preferences using a set of 11 incentivized choices between a lottery and a safe option (inspired by Dohmen et al., 2011). Then the participants make decisions in three investment games and answer a set of questions. Only one of the decisions is selected for payment which is decided in the final roll of a dice.
Experimental design
In an online experiment, the participants reveal their risk preferences, make decisions in three investment games and answer a set of questions. The “investment into returns game” represents the conventional scenario where the probability of success of an investment project is exogenously given and people invest (part of) their endowment to get a tripled return. Each participant has a 50% chance to roll a star, in which case he/she triples their investment, and a 50% chance to roll an empty side, in which case he/she receives 0. In the “investment into probability game”, the return of the game is exogenously given but the participants choose the probability with which they would like to play the game. The amount of money the participants decide to invest determines the number of sides with a star on a die. The order of these two games is randomized. At the beginning of each game, the participants are endowed with money that they can use for investment decisions. To understand the level of understanding of the game instructions, the participants answer a set of control questions before making each investment decision. The participants are financially incentivized to answer the questions correctly.
Our theoretical findings predict that if we implement policies in which investments increase the probability of success, we shall observe risk-averse people either to invest all they have or nothing. In that case, we should see a unimodal distribution of investment choices in the return game and a bimodal distribution in the probability game, especially for the risk-averse individuals. We elicit participants’ willingness to take a risk using a set of 11 choices between a lottery and a safe option (Dohmen et al., 2011). The choices are displayed in a table with 11 rows. We do not ask the participants to make a decision for each row separately. Instead, we ask them to reveal in which row their preferences switch (i.e., from which row they start preferring Option B over Option A). The decision is incentivized and can be selected for payment with a 10% probability. Later in the experiment, we also ask the participants a general question to self-evaluate themselves in terms of their willingness to take a risk.
Our theory also predicts that risk-averse agents should select a lottery with a higher probability of winning, rather than a lottery with the same probability but higher return. In the final “step-by-step game”, we empirically test this claim. The expected returns in each of the four decisions are equal. The decision paths allow us to check whether the second-order stochastic dominance holds.
Once the participants make their final decision in the Step-by-step game and answer a set of questions, they roll their dice to see the outcomes in each game separately. Only one of the investment outcomes is selected for payment which is decided in the final roll of a dice.
Design details
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