Insurance, Maternal Care, and Early Childhood Development: Evidence from Kenya

How to cite

Johnson, Terence. 2021. "Insurance, Maternal Care, and Early Childhood Development: Evidence from Kenya." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007424. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7424-1.0

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Terence Johnson*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0007424
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7424-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2017-01-20 – 2021-06-14
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7424

Abstract

A new health center --- Brother Andre Maternal and Child Health Care Center --- recently opened in
Dandora, Kenya, a slum of approximately 150,000 inhabitants in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya.
Dandora is home to the city's largest garbage dump, and many struggle to find and keep consistent
employment.
The first goal of the project is to evaluate the impact of the health care center on the population. In
particular, we propose using randomization in the value and price of vouchers to experimentally vary
expectant mothers' propensity to use the health center, and then use this variation to measure the
impact of the hospital itself. Our hypothesis is that the hospital has significant effects on maternal
well-being after the birth, as measure in severity of hemorrhaging and child well-being as measured
by birth-weight.
The second goal of the project is to measure the effect of additional wealth on maternal and child
health outcomes. This is achieved through the randomization, since we will directly observe
households' characteristics and willingness-to-pay directly, but they will report their willingness-topay
before learning the price. This allows us to compare households who end up paying a lower
price to those who pay a higher one, and thereby learn the effect of additional wealth on average.
This provides important evidence for policies like maternal leave or even maternal grants that
financially support pregnancies. Our hypothesis is that the larger the difference is between a
household's stated willingness-to-pay and the the price the end up paying, the healthier the mother
and child will be.
The third goal of the project is to evaluate existing methodologies for understanding insurance
choice. Existing studies interpret data from markets in developed countries through a complicated
framework of statistical and economic assumptions to rationalize observed decisions and outcomes.
Our experimental study will, instead, measure many of these variables directly. This allows us to
apply existing methodologies to our experimental data and determine whether the answers are
correct or not. Our hypothesis is that a number of restrictive assumptions (multivariate logit errors,
ignoring adverse selection, neglecting the subjective beliefs of market participants) are important,
and lead to misleading results. We hope to either verify that these assumptions are problematic and
suggest remedies, or verify that existing approaches actually provide the right answers.

In particular, we want to measure the impact of the introduction of a new, safe, clean hospital to a
population who has previously reported experiencing obstetric violence at the hands of care-givers
and other serious challenges before, during, and after birth. Since we are exploiting experimental
variation to measure this effect, the results will tell us the benefits of introducing similar facilities into
comparable contexts. In many countries, traditional birth attendants and relatively inferior maternal
health clinics are still a challenge to maternal health, and the study will provide evidence about how
improved facilities can lead to better outcomes for mothers and children.
This experimental evidence will be achieved by randomizing the value and prices of vouchers for
care, and offering them to study participants (described in more detail below). This provides
economic data on how people in developing countries cope with the risk of incurring large
expenditures, particularly during a Cesarean section birth. We can then use these very rich data to
evaluate the methodology used by economists and public health specialists when trying to
understand insurance choice in developed countries, and provide a critique and possible remedies.
Since we are adopting a methodology
that allows us to observe household willingness-to-pay for insurance directly, we can provide
evidence on a well-defined and clear health risk (pregnancy), as opposed to a number of previous
studies that focus on crop insurance or general health insurance. The advantage of our study is that
it is health-related and a ubiquitous risk about which women face sincere risk. Unlike crop
insurance, it is a product many are familiar with (Kenya offers national health insurance, which is
unaffordable but desired by many in our targeted population). Unlike insurance experiments in the
US or Taiwan, our targeted population suffers a lack of institutions and outside options available to
those in developed countries. Finally, many households in developing countries hold their wealth in
relationships with other households, who share financial burdens and call in financial favors when
necessary. This makes the experimental evidence more useful for development policy compared to
studies from western countries, where financial assets or credit can be used to pay for care.

Experimental design

We randomize the redemptive value and prices of vouchers for treatment at a specialized maternal and child care facility, and elicit demand for the vouchers from participants using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. This provides economic data on how people in developing countries cope with the risk of incurring large expenditures, particularly when a Cesarean section is a possibility. This also provides data on how women trade off the price with the quality of care, determining what facility they give birth at or whether they elect a home birth.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization on Tablets and a Public lottery: the face value of the voucher and the deposit percentage of the price that must be paid up front are randomized on the tablet at the start of the baseline survey. Study participants are shown the possible prices as laminated pieces of paper, the pieces of paper are dropped into an opaque cloth bag and shaken, and then they select a price themselves. The participant pays the deposit percentage up front, and the rest is deducted from the face value of the voucher. The redemptive value of the voucher is the face value minus the balance after the deposit is paid.
Randomization unit
The randomization unit is the individual woman in the study: the price each woman faces is randomized. We record whether women are members of the same household, and will cluster results at the household level.
Clusters
7000 women Each woman is presented with a BDM demand elicitation game, where the prices and generosity of the care being offered are randomized on the enumerator's tablet at the start of the baseline interview.
Observations
7000 women Each woman is presented with a BDM demand elicitation game, where the prices and generosity of the care being offered are randomized on the enumerator's tablet at the start of the baseline interview.
Arms
7000 women Each woman is presented with a BDM demand elicitation game, where the prices and generosity of the care being offered are randomized on the enumerator's tablet at the start of the baseline interview.
Primary outcomes
The main end points of interest are: 1. Maternal health: self-reported basic measures include, were additional returns to the hospital required; did mothers have to be transferred to a more advanced hospital because of complications; how long did it take for mothers to return to a normal level of activity. We ask additional questions about symptoms --- fever, swelling in legs, vaginal hemorrhage or discharge, etc. --- to get additional information about what conditions the women might have been suffering from, and whether those conditions are related to quality of care or sanitary conditions at the hospital they chose. 2. Quality of care received: self-reported measures of cleanliness and sanitation; responsiveness to mothers' requests for pain relief or discomfort; obstetric violence; forced use of beds by multiple mothers during labor or after the birth; treatment of newborns (e.g. use of incubators) 3. Child health: whether, how frequently, and how long breastfeeding took place; weight, height at birth and subsequent ages; mortality (though we are underpowered for any kind of treatment effects on this variable); and various additional diagnostic conditions shortly after birth such as distressed breathing, discolored skin, diarrhea or vomiting. 4. Care decisions: do women select higher quality places to receive care, and how does the expected price of care shift this decision. In particular, do women select to give birth at home and opt out of the formal health care system. As this is is not a standard design with a treatment arm and a control arm but does allow selection into treatment via the BDM mechanism, we plan to use an instrumental variables approach to analyze these outcomes as well as more structural approaches. Define the redemptive value of the voucher as the face value minus the amount paid by the household: the net benefit of getting the voucher through the BDM mechanism. To measure the effect of getting care at this specific hospital, we will run a first stage including the voucher's price and redemptive value and measures of individual/household wealth on the decision to use the maternal center, and then regress mother and child health outcomes on fitted values and the same set of covariates in the second stage. This controls for household wealth but the random price and redemptive value experimentally shifts, conditional on x, the propensity of a household to use the maternal center. Since the price and redemptive value are random (randomized on enumerator tablet or through the BDM experiment), they satisfy the exclusion restriction. Whether they are sufficiently strong instruments will be determined by the outcome of the experiment. Similarly, to analyze the impact of quality on outcomes, we gather data on community perceptions ("If the price of delivery were zero at each hospital, how would you rank them") versus revealed preferences ("The last time you gave birth, where did you go? How much did you pay?"). This allows us to rank the available options, and see how the ranking correlated with questions about the sanitary conditions, quality of doctors and staff, and other questions. We can then substitute the decision of whether the participant goes to the particular maternal health center with a quality index or ranking in the first stage, and then regress health and economic outcomes in the second stage on the predicted quality of care from the first stage.
Secondary outcomes
In terms of mechanisms, we are interested in a number of secondary outcomes or channels through which treatment effects might be operating: Household stress and bargaining: did vouchers reduce divorce rates and self-reported conflict within the household? Investments in child health and education: did the money saved on delivery allow for more investment in early childhood development, particularly nutrition and education?

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