Leveraging Local Electoral Accountability to Improve Service Delivery in Rural India

How to cite

Allard, Jenna; Moore, Charity Troyer; Pande, Rohini; Neggers, Yusuf. 2021. "Leveraging Local Electoral Accountability to Improve Service Delivery in Rural India." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007380. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7380-2.1

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Jenna Allard* , Charity Troyer Moore , Rohini Pande , Yusuf Neggers

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0007380
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7380-2.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2020-09-01 – 2023-12-31
Countries
India ()
JEL codes
D7, I3, J4, M5, O1
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7380

Abstract

This study focuses on how information constraints for local bureaucrats and politicians affect processing of wage payments for low-income workers who participate in the Indian government’s primary safety net program for the rural poor, designed around the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, or MGNREGA. The intervention tests whether providing wage-payment-related information through the local bureaucratic and political governance structures can expedite processing of worker wage payments, whether there is complementarity or substitutability in providing this information to both bureaucrats and elected leaders, and the extent to which electoral incentives and other incentives to collaborate mediate these results.

Intervention

In this randomized control trial (RCT), which takes place across three districts in the state of Bihar, we examine how MGNREGA worker wage payment processing times are affected by sending messages which potentially decrease the costs of acquiring management-relevant information and monitoring for local-level bureaucrats and/or elected officials involved with the program.

Experimental design

Treatment assignment is randomized at the level of gram panchayat (village cluster). Messages with information related to wage payment processing are sent at regular intervals to officials’ own mobile phones and only provide information about the locality over which they have responsibility.
Treatment arms are defined as follows:
1. Control: status quo, bureaucrats and elected officials do not receive payment-related messages.
2. TB: only bureaucrats are sent payment-related messages.
3. TP: only elected officials (politicians) are sent payment-related messages.
4. TBP: elected officials and bureaucrats both receive payment-related messages.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization of districts was completed in an office by a computer using STATA.
Randomization unit
Gram panchayat
Clusters
1,077 gram panchayats
Observations
We plan to focus the analysis of our primary outcome of interest at the panchayat-month level for the 1,077 gram panchayats in our sample for a 10+ month period (subject to budget). We also plan to utilize electoral results data, at the panchayat/candidate level, from an election that is expected to occur during our intervention period. Additionally, we aim to collect and use baseline and follow up survey data from the local elected officials (mukhiyas) and bureaucrats (PRSes) present at baseline in our sample panchayats. Each gram panchayat has a single elected official. In some cases, these officials also have representatives that assist them in their work. In these cases, we attempt to survey both mukhiyas and their representatives.
Arms
1. Control: status quo, bureaucrats and elected officials do not receive payment-related messages: 268 gram panchayats 2. TB: only bureaucrats are sent payment-related messages: 270 gram panchayats 3. TP: only elected officials (politicians) are sent payment-related messages: 270 gram panchayats 4. TBP: elected officials and bureaucrats both receive payment-related messages: 269 gram panchayats
Primary outcomes
Our primary outcome of interest is average time to complete the steps of worker wage payment processing under panchayat and block officer purview.
Secondary outcomes
We will additionally examine variability of processing times (relying primarily on average absolute deviation), volume of work, and local electoral performance of mukhiyas in the expected 2021 election cycle.

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Keywords