The effect of regulatory complexity on individual voluntary climate action behavior: A representative online field experiment in Germany

How to cite

Jarke-Neuert, Johannes; Perino, Grischa; Frondel, Manuel; Flörchinger, Daniela. 2021. "The effect of regulatory complexity on individual voluntary climate action behavior: A representative online field experiment in Germany." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007372. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7372-2.0

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Johannes Jarke-Neuert* , Grischa Perino , Manuel Frondel , Daniela Flörchinger

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0007372
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7372-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2021-06-11 – 2021-07-02
Countries
Germany (National)
JEL codes
C93, D02, D83, D91, H41, Q54, Q58
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7372

Abstract

A sample that is representative for the German adult population is drawn and randomly assigned to five experimental conditions that differ in the amount of true information given prior to a decision whether and at what time to retire an EU ETS allowance at a financial cost. The information describes the market stability reserve (MSR) and its implications on how the timing of retirement influences the actual amount of greenhouse gas emissions saved. The level of detail ("complexity") of the description is manipulated across the experimental conditions. The hypothesis is that increasing levels of complexity increase the willingness to delay allowance retirement for a higher climate benefit, but reduce the overall willingness to voluntarily abate by retiring an allowance.

Intervention

The amount of true information supplied to subjects prior to their decision whether and when to retire an allowance from the EU ETS at a personal opportunity cost. The information describes the market stability reserve (MSR) and its implications on how the timing of retirement influences the actual amount of greenhouse gas emissions saved. The level of detail ("complexity") of the description differs across the five experimental conditions: There are two control condtions without reference to the MSR, and three treatment conditions that supply successively more information.

Experimental design

Subjects are sampled from the Socio-Ecological Panel (Green-SÖP, Wave 7), which is representative for the German population. Each subject completes a questionnaire, which will be published in full with the Green-SÖP Wave 7 dataset (http://fdz.rwi-essen.de/doi.html). The parts relevant for the present experiment are provided with annotations in the Docs & Materials section, both in the German original and machine translated (https://www.deepl.com/translator) form (for sake of replicability).

Subjects sampled for the experiment are randomly assigned to one of five experimental conditions: CC1 (B_Kontrolle 1 in the questionnaire), CC2 (B_Kontrolle 2), TC1 (B_Komplexität 1), TC2 (B_Komplexität 2), TC3 (B_Komplexität 3). In all conditions subjects respond to the pre-treatment questions ExpB0 and ExpB1. Depending on treatment assignment, subjects respond to question ExpB2_a (CC1), ExpB2_b (CC2), ExpB2_c (TC1), ExpB2_d (TC2), ExpB2_e (TC3). All questions involve a real decision whether - and if applicable when - to retire an allowance from the EU ETS at a personal opportunity cost. The amount of true information supplied to subjects prior to their decision is manipulated across conditions. The information describes the market stability reserve (MSR) and its implications on how the timing of retirement influences the actual amount of greenhouse gas emissions saved. The level of detail ("complexity") of the description differs across the five experimental conditions: There are two control condtions without reference to the MSR (CC1 and CC2), and three treatment conditions that supply successively more information (TC1, TC2, and TC3).

The design is motived by the following behavioral model:
Subjects have preferences for both private consumption $x$ and contributions to the public good $y$. We assume they are additive and represented by utility function $u$: $u(x,y) = x + \rho(T) \cdot v(y)$ with $v’ > 0$. $\rho(T) \geq 0$ with $T = CC1, CC2, TC1, TC2, TC3$ captures contextual aspects of the treatment specific choice situation (T) such as the degree of complexity involved. This implies that within treatment and hence subject $u(x_0,y_i) < u(x_0,y_j)$ iff $y_i < y_j$. Factually, the available $y_i$ are the same for all conditions except CC1 and TC3. However, in terms of the information available to subjects regarding the effectiveness of the options available there is also a difference between CC2 and TC1/TC2 as the latter explicitly rank the available cancellation options. Given that we hold $x$ constant across all treatments, differences in choice patterns between treatments reflect factual or perceived differences in the size of $y$ and choice context $\rho(T)$ induced by treatment variations. Note, that changes in $\rho$ only affect the choice between cancellation and private consumption, i.e. between $x$ and $y$ but not between the two cancellation options available in all conditions except CC1.

The experiment is designed to test how WC and REC are affected by revealing unexpected and potentially morally contested information on effects of voluntary climate action and the complexity of the explanations provided. To those that are willing to contribute the information provided in TC1-3 is relevant as it reveals a strict dominance in effectiveness at identical costs ($ y_1 < y_2$). Furthermore, the information is most likely surprising as the implications of the Market Stability Reserve (and indeed the mechanism’s mere existence) are known only to an expert circle. The common belief among supporters of climate actions is that (in particular at identical costs) early action is better than delaying it (UNEP 2021, Figure 3 & 6), i.e. that ($ y_1 > y_2$). Hence, at least some participants will update their beliefs and prefer late cancellations. Updating of beliefs over the relative effectiveness of early and late cancellation can be biased, because "bad news" are discounted in certain contexts (Eil & Rao 2011, Gershman 2019, Kuzmanovic et al. 2018, Yao et al. 2021). We therefore do not expect that all contributors choose the late cancellation option. The first key hypothesis is:

Hypothesis KH1: REC is larger in TC1-3 than in CC2.

However, there might be a trade-off between REC and participants’ willingness to contribute. The information might conflict with the moral belief that urgent action on climate change is a moral obligation. Hence, there might be an aversion to see this belief challenged or an urge to act against it (Bénabou & Tirole 2011). Moreover, if the dissonance or ambivalence induced is sufficiently strong, participants might be less willing to contribute at all in order to avoid having to make a choice that they are ambivalent about (Anderson 2003, Luce et al. 1997). In this case $\rho(TC1-3) < \rho(CC2 & CC1)$. The second key hypothesis is therefore:

Hypothesis KH2: WC is smaller in TC1-3 than in CC1 & CC2.

The bibliography is provided in the "Docs & Materials" section.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
Individual subject randomization.
Clusters
Since randomization is done at the individual subject level, there is a single treatment cluster (i.e. treatment is "non-clustered"). Statistical analyses will account for potential effect heterogeneity across spatial and temporal quasi-clusters defined by the region of residence and survey participation date by means of mixed effects modeling. The number of those quasi-clusters is endogenous.
Observations
4,000 individuals
Arms
Control condition one of two: 480 individuals Control condition two of two: 640 individuals Treatment conditions: 960 individuals each
Primary outcomes
Control condition one of two (CC1): Decision between (1) a 5 EUR bonus, (2) retirement of an emission allowance from the EU ETS, and (3) a non-response option (three discrete choices). Control condition two of two (CC2): Decision between (1) a 5 EUR bonus, retirement of an emission allowance from the EU ETS either (2a) immediately after the end of the field phase of the survey or (2b) one year later, and (3) a non-response option (four discrete choices). Treatment condition one of three (TC1): As in control condition two of two. Treatment condition two of three (TC2): As in control condition two of two. Treatment condition three of three (TC3): Decision between (1) a 5 EUR bonus, retirement of an emission allowance from the EU ETS either (2a) immediately after the end of the field phase of the survey or (2b) at a yet to be determined date at least one year later, and (3) a non-response option (four discrete choices). The date of late retirement is determined by a scientific assessment of when the impact of retirement on total emission reduction within the EU ETS would be largest, given the current regulatory framework. This option is actually offered by several climate action NGOs in Germany.
Secondary outcomes
n/a
Sponsors
Name: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) Location: Bonn, Germany Url: https://www.dfg.de/en/index.jsp Name: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie Location: Berlin, Germany Url: https://www.bmwi.de/Navigation/EN/Home/home.html
Partners
Name: forsa Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung und statistische Analysen Partner_type: private_company Url: https://www.forsa.de/1/

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Keywords