Salience-driven political polarization
How to cite
Feldhaus, Christoph; Khalmetski, Kiryl; Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus. 2021. "Salience-driven political polarization." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007290. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7290-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We test whether portraying a social issue as more or less controversial provides more or less focus on the corresponding issue relative to an issue that is fundamentally portrayed as noncontroversial. To this end, we set up a model describing how political choice may be affected by focusing and provide an experiment that aims to provide evidence for the main prediction of the model.
Intervention
Rendering social issues as more or less controversial by letting participants decide between organizations that have the same attitude toward the topic or between organizations that have opposite attitudes toward the topic.
Experimental design
We distribute a survey with a market research company. The survey consists of three parts and one randomly chosen decision of 10 % of the participants is payoff relevant.
Part 1: In Part 1, participants take 3 decisions where they can distribute 30 Euros between two different social issues represented by two different organizations. They can only give positive amounts of money to one of the two organizations per topic. In each of the 3 decisions, that are shown in a random order, one of the topics is "Support for the elderly" and both corresponding organizations are in favor of supporting the elderly. In addition, with respect to the second social issue, participants are confronted with 2 out of 4 randomly chosen organizations, two of which are in favor of the respective topic and two of which are engaged against the respective topic.
The potentially controversial topics are:
Equality for homosexual people
Female quotas
Left and right/conservative politics
Part 2: In Part 2, participants decide separately for each of their decisions in Part 1 how much of 2 Euros, that they receive in case they and the respective decision are randomly chosen, they are willing to pay to make sure that their decision rather than the decision of a randomly chosen other participant determines the outcomes. We use the BDM mechanism.
Part 3: In Part 3, participants decide which of only two organizations shall receive 30 Euros. Specifically, they decide for each of the potentially controversial topics whether an organization that is in favor of or against the respective topic should receive the money. The two organizations they are confronted with are randomly chosen making sure that one organization is in favour and one is against the respective topic.
Design details
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