Access to affordable medical treatments may be endangered by the current bargaining system, in which the prices countries pay remain secret. Proponents of price confidentiality claim that it enables price cuts for poorer countries. In a laboratory experiment, we provide empirical evidence on the effects of price transparency in bargaining.
Experimental design
Experimental markets with 4 countries (representing The Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Spain) and one pharmaceutical company.
Three treatments: (1) price secrecy, where countries cannot share prices with other countries; (2) price transparency, where countries can share prices and observe other countries' prices; (3) full transparency, where in addition to price transparency, countries learn the company's R&D cost.
Design details
Randomization method
We implemented two die rolls for ordering of treatments. Treatment orders are for the first sessions: T2, T3, T1. For the second sessions: T1, T2, T3.
Randomization unit
Randomization of the treatment at a session level.
Clusters
26 market groups per treatment.
This is the targeted number of groups. As this is an online experiment involving multiple labs, we recruit such that this number is reached, but better or worse than expected show-up or drop-outs may influence the number of groups per treatment. We randomize in advance the treatment assignment, and have recruitment balanced across treatments.
Observations
5 participants per market group per treatment, so 390 participants.
Arms
Per treatment, 130 participants in 26 market groups.
Primary outcomes
See the analysis plan.
Sponsors
Name: Netherlands Cancer Institute
Location: Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Url: https://www.nki.nl
Name: Amsterdam Center for Behavioral Change
Location: University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Url: https://ase.uva.nl/research/amsterdam-center-for-behavioral-change/amsterdam-center-for-behavioral-change.html
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