Behavioral Biases among Producers: Experimental Evidence of Anchoring in Procurement Auctions

How to cite

Shukla, Pallavi; Ferraro, Paul; Messer, Kent; Weigel, Collin. 2021. "Behavioral Biases among Producers: Experimental Evidence of Anchoring in Procurement Auctions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007219. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7219-1.0

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Pallavi Shukla* , Paul Ferraro , Kent Messer , Collin Weigel

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0007219
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7219-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2014-01-13 – 2018-10-17
Countries
United States of America ()
JEL codes
D91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7219

Abstract

Experimental research in behavioral economics focuses on consumer behaviors. Similar research on profit-maximizing producers is rare. In three field experiments involving commercial agricultural producers in the US, we test whether anchoring affects producer bids in competitive auctions for conservation cost-share contracts worth thousands of dollars. In conservation cost-share contracts, the costs of implementing an on-farm conservation practice (an impure public good) are shared by the farmer and an external agent (e.g., government or non-profit). In the three field auctions in the study, the value of the starting cost-share bid was randomized to be either 0% or 100%. We estimate the effect of the starting bid price on final bids and whether experience with conservation contracts attenuates the treatment effect.

Intervention

In three competitive auctions for conservation cost-share contracts, the value of the starting cost-share bid was randomized to be either 0% or 100% (i.e., the default starting was either "producer pays everything" or "external agent pays everything").

Experimental design

We conduct three competitive agri-environmental incentive auctions with US farm producers. The auctions were embedded in conservation programs that were run as cost-share programs, in which the procurer and the bidder shared the total cost of contract implementation; i.e., the bids were expressed as the percent of the total cost that the producer would pay, varying from 0% to 100%. In the auctions, bidders made cost-share offers (bids) for environmental contracts that provide them with cash assistance for implementing technologies or land-use practices that provide private and public benefits (an impure public good). For example, farmers could choose to install in-ground filters (a technology) or vegetative buffer strips (a practice), which retain farm soil (private benefit) and remove fertilizer runoff before it enters and pollutes surface waters (public benefit). The treatment in our experimental study was an anchor in which the starting bid viewed by producers, which was randomly assigned to be 0% for half of the participants and 100% for the other half.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer-generated randomization
Randomization unit
Individual
Observations
For the StewardShares I and II auctions, all producers who had a registered nutrient management plan with the state of Delaware were eligible to participate. There was no planned number of observations. For the StewardShares III auction, which had less restrictive eligibility, the planned number of observations was 1200.
Arms
We planned to assign 50% of the sample to the 0% default starting bid price and 50% of the sample to the 100% default starting bid price for each of the three experiments.
Primary outcomes
We estimate the average effect of the starting-bid anchor on the value of producers’ final bids. We also study whether experience with such auctions has a moderating effect on the magnitude of any anchoring effect.

Materials

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Keywords