Preferences for affirmative action policies
How to cite
Willrodt, Jana; Herzog, Sabrina; Schildberg-Hoerisch, Hannah; Trieu, Chi. 2021. "Preferences for affirmative action policies." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007131. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7131-1.2
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Support for affirmative action policies is typically higher among those who would be favored by them. There are several possible explanations for this gap. One explanation are the different experiences these groups have made, for example in the workplace, while another is that opinions on affirmative action are influenced by in-group favoritism and/or self-serving motives.
We test these possible explanations in a stylized environment that allows us to vary the stakes individuals have in the decision in favor of or against an affirmative action policy. For this purpose, we conduct an online experiment using a US sample provided by Prolific that is representative with respect to age, gender, and ethnicity. The experiment includes a tournament where half of the tournament participants are randomly assigned to a disadvantaged group. Subjects decide whether or not they prefer a quota rule compensating for that disadvantage to be used in determining the tournament winners.Three different treatments allow us to disentangle impartial preferences for affirmative action from other motives like in-group favoritism and self-interest.
Intervention
experimental treatments: PARTIAL, SPEC-TYPE, SPEC (details are provided below, see experimental design)
Addendum March 14, 2024:
Two additional treatments are added: PARTIAL-GENDER and SPEC-GENDER (see details below)
Experimental design
We employ a between-subject design with three treatments.
Affirmative action is represented by a quota rule that, depending on subjects' decisions, may or may not be applied to govern the outcome of a tournament. In the tournament, subjects complete a real-effort task that consists of encoding words by substituting the letters of the alphabet with specific numbers given in a table. Subjects participate in the tournament in groups of six. Without the quota rule, the two subjects who encode most words correctly in five minutes are the winners and receive a monetary prize. The remaining four tournament participants are losers and don't receive any monetary payment. Three of the six tournament participants are assigned to the "Green Group" that is disadvantaged since every correctly encoded word is only counted as 0.9 words, while the other three tournament participants are assigned to the "Blue Group" whose performance is not downgraded. Before the start of the tournament subjects decide whether they want to implement a quota rule that ensures that at least one, namely the highest performing, member of the disadvantaged "Green Group" has to be selected as a winner.
One of six subjects' choices is randomly drawn to be implemented. Depending on random treatment assignment, subjects are either i) first assigned to either the disadvantaged or advantaged group, then decide on the quota rule for their own group and participate in the tournament themselves (PARTIAL treatment), ii) first assigned to either the disadvantaged or advantaged group, then decide on the quota rule for a group of tournament participants but only observe the tournament outcome without participating in the tournament themselves (SPEC-G treatment), or iii) are not assigned to any group, decide on the quota rule for a group of tournament participants and only observe the tournament outcome without participating in the tournament themselves (SPEC treatment). A fourth group of subjects acts as tournament participants, for whom subjects in the SPEC-TYPE and SPEC treatment decide on the implementation of the quota rule, but is not of major interest for our research question. Between-subject comparisons between the disadvantaged and standard group as well as between treatments allow us to disentangle impartial preferences for affirmative action policies from other motives, in particular in-group favoritism and self-interest (relating to own chances of winning).
In all three treatments, subjects answer a questionnaire that elicits the following measures: beliefs about chances of winning (with and without the quota rule), in-group favoritism, risk aversion, altruism, socio-demographics, political orientation, prior experienced discrimination, preferences for efficiency, overconfidence, and perceived fairness of the quota rule. These measures serve to analytically show what drives preferences for implementing affirmative action on a within-subject level.
Addendum March,14, 2024:
While we used a minimal group paradigm (Green and Blue group) before, we add two new treatments (PARTIAL-GENDER and SPEC-GENDER) that use groups that supposedly subjects identify with even more strongly. We conduct the same experiment as before but instead of random assignment to either the disadvantaged or advantaged group, women are always assigned to the disadvantaged and men to the advantaged group and subjects know this.
Addendum August 18, 2025:
Additional survey data collection (in response to reviewer report; for details, see pdf "Addendum to Data analysis plan for new survey data")
Design details
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