Self-Verification Mechanisms for Investment Decisions

How to cite

Waichman, Israel; Requate, Till; Stenzel, Aurel. 2021. "Self-Verification Mechanisms for Investment Decisions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007061. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7061-1.2000000000000002

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Israel Waichman* , Till Requate , Aurel Stenzel

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0007061
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7061-1.2000000000000002
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2021-01-19 – 2021-02-28
Countries
Germany ()
JEL codes
C9; D7; G2; O4
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7061

Abstract

The situation between investors and startups is typically characterized by asymmetric information inducing adverse selection and thus suboptimal investments. To mitigate inefficiencies, investors often engage in costly verification processes referred to as due diligence. Additionally, latest technological innovations help to considerably reduce transaction costs. In this project, we suggest a novel “startup investment game” experiment and a series of treatments to test for the effects of costly verification and self-verification. Depending on the results, a policy conclusion could be to support platforms based on the recent self-verification technologies.

Intervention

Our workhorse is an investment game. We implement five treatments with different verification mechanisms: (i) Baseline, (ii) Costly Noisy Verification, (iii) Costly Verification, (iv) Costly Self-Verification, and (v) Self-Verification

Experimental design

Our workhorse is an investment game. We implement five treatments with different verification mechanisms: Baseline, Costly Noisy Verification, Costly Verification, Costly Self-Verification, Self-Verification”

The experiment will be conducted online using Otree (Chen et al., 2016) with participant pool from an economics department experimental lab.

Design details

Randomization method
All participants are recruited from the same participant pool of an experimental economics lab. We randomized the experimental sessions using a computer (4-5 sessions per treatment for a total of 20-25 sessions). In each session, individual rules (investor, firm) are randomly determined by the Otree program.
Randomization unit
Experimental session
Clusters
Between 4 and 5 experimental sessions per treatment for 5 treatments: A total of of 20-25 experimental sessions.
Observations
4 or 5 sessions per treatment for 5 treatments. Each session with about 20 participants: Thus, a total of 400-500 participants, where each pair of participants is an independent observations. Hence, the number of independent observations: 200-250 (i.e., between 40 and 50 per treatment for 5 treatments ).
Arms
Baseline treatment´with 4-5 sessions (80-100 participants); Costly Noisy Verification treatment with 4-5 sessions (80-100 participants); Costly Verification treatment with 4-5 sessions (80-100 participants); Costly Self-Verification treatment with 4-5 sessions (80-100 participants); Self-Verification treatment with 4-5 sessions (80-100 participants)
Primary outcomes
Amount invested in the firm (conditional on success probability)
Secondary outcomes
Success probability communicated to the investor Verification (yes / no)

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords