Self-Verification Mechanisms for Investment Decisions
How to cite
Waichman, Israel; Requate, Till; Stenzel, Aurel. 2021. "Self-Verification Mechanisms for Investment Decisions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007061. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7061-1.2000000000000002
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The situation between investors and startups is typically characterized by asymmetric information inducing adverse selection and thus suboptimal investments. To mitigate inefficiencies, investors often engage in costly verification processes referred to as due diligence. Additionally, latest technological innovations help to considerably reduce transaction costs. In this project, we suggest a novel “startup investment game” experiment and a series of treatments to test for the effects of costly verification and self-verification. Depending on the results, a policy conclusion could be to support platforms based on the recent self-verification technologies.
Intervention
Our workhorse is an investment game. We implement five treatments with different verification mechanisms: (i) Baseline, (ii) Costly Noisy Verification, (iii) Costly Verification, (iv) Costly Self-Verification, and (v) Self-Verification
Experimental design
Our workhorse is an investment game. We implement five treatments with different verification mechanisms: Baseline, Costly Noisy Verification, Costly Verification, Costly Self-Verification, Self-Verification”
The experiment will be conducted online using Otree (Chen et al., 2016) with participant pool from an economics department experimental lab.
Design details
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