Can Health Insurance Reduce Poverty?

How to cite

Chemin, Matthieu. 2015. "Can Health Insurance Reduce Poverty?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000705. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.705-1.0

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Matthieu Chemin*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0000705
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.705-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2010-10-01 – 2014-06-01
Countries
Kenya (Central Province)
JEL codes
I13, O17
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/705

Abstract

This paper presents the pre-analysis plan of two randomized interventions aimed at evaluating the causal impact of health insurance on engagement in higher-health-risk higher-return activities, and poverty. In one treatment group, we offer free health insurance to small-scale farmers in Kenya. In another group, without any subsidies, we present information about the product to existing social networks, which contain early adopters who have experienced the product before. Our primary hypothesis is that health insurance will engage people in higher-health-risk higher-return activities. Our secondary hypothesis is that the second intervention increases trust in the product, and thus take-up and risk-taking behavior despite the absence of any subsidies.

Intervention

Subsidy

In this treatment group, we offer free (or 90% subsidy) health insurance. In the privacy of people's homes, we 1) deliver and present an NHIF brochure containing all relevant information about the product, 2) explain the very basic concept of insurance with a cartoon, 3) offer assistance to register (filling the form and sending it on their behalf to NHIF). Note that participants still had to visit our office with the proper documents (national identification card for all adults and birth certificate for all children) for us to organize the rest of the registration.

Informal group meetings

For other randomly selected households, we organize meetings for them and their existing informal group. The intuition of our intervention is that close friends who have themselves experienced a reimbursement by NHIF are best placed to reinforce trust in NHIF. As one of our respondents put it: "I have no previous experience with insurance, but I have a friend who has NHIF. When that man's wife fell ill, NHIF paid the bill in full. Therefore, I trust the company and understand how it works". To find these close and respected friends, we use existing social networks in the following way.
To the general audience of the group meeting, we offer the same information and assistance to register as in the subsidy intervention. No subsidies are offered. We do not incentivize early adopters to talk. This intervention merely provides an environment in which to share a positive experience about NHIF.

Information

To verify whether trust in the product can be increased by the informational content delivered in the meetings, in another location, we delivered the same information to other households on an individual basis (brochure, cartoon, and assistance to register as in the groups)

Experimental design

For the subsidy treatment, we randomly select 169 households to receive free (or 90% subsidy) health insurance outof our sample.
For the "informal group meeting" intervention, we randomly select 186 households living in another location (an administrative subdivision of radius 2 hours by foot). We ask them to identify the most important social group that they belong to (e.g., ROSCAs, clan or family groups, church groups). Upon approval by the chairperson (obtained in 92 percent of the cases), we then organize a presentation at the usual meeting time and place of the group.
For the information intervention, we randomly select 389 households.
Two control groups are considered. First, we consider the 283 households living in the same location as participants receiving an informal group meeting. Despite them not being invited to a meeting, it is possible that some of them attend. This is due to the fact that they belong to the same group as our participants. This group thus measures the potential spillovers inherent in organizing group meetings. Second, 359 households from another location formed a "purer" control group. They live much farther from the treatment group. This control group received no other interventions.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by computer
Randomization unit
Individual randomization.
Clusters
The treatment is not clustered. Standard errors will be clustered at the location level, an administrative geographical unit in Kenya.
Observations
1,386
Arms
Subsidy: 169 Informal group meeting: 186 Information: 389 Control group spillovers: 283 Control group: 359
Primary outcomes
High-health-risk high return activities ∙ Pesticide use ∙ Fertilizer use ∙ Cattle growing ∙ Total income from risky activities (crops using pesticide, avocado, macademia, cattle) per month per capita (Multiplying price of each crop or livestock by quantity sold at market, sold to broker, or consumed at home) ∙ Total income from less risky activities (other crops, other livestock, formal sector work) ∙ Total income per month per capita Health outcomes ∙ Hospitalizations in the last 2 years for any household member ∙ Hospital expenditures ∙ Work accidents in last month for any household member ∙ Any illness or disease in last month for any household member (malaria, typhoid, work / duties accident, other household accident, permanent disability, heart problems, fatigue, old age) ∙ Days of work lost due to these diseases Informal insurance ∙ Total savings ∙ In an informal group? ∙ savings within the group ∙ hospitality, i.e., the amount one gets if one is hospitalized, increases ∙ Have you ever left a group or separated from a group and formed a new one? ∙ On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being completely unlikely and 5 being completely certain, how likely is it that your group will dismantle within the next 5 years? ∙ How reliable are the other members of your group for paying their group contributions? 01. Not at all reliable 02. A little reliable 03. Somewhat reliable 04. Significantly reliable 05. Always reliable ∙ Size of group ∙ How much authority does your group's chairperson/executive have over your group? 01. No [...] 02. Little [...] 03. Moderate [...] 04. Significant [...] 05. Very significant [...] ∙ How much trust do you have in your group members?01. No [...] 02. Little [...] 03. Moderate [...] 04. Significant [...] 05. Very significant [...] ∙ Say you are registered for NHIF. Then you fall sick and have to go to the hospital, but you are covered. Will your group still pay-out the same amount of "hospitality" regardless of your coverage? Effects of interventions ∙ Do you trust NHIF? 1. Distrust completely, 2. Somewhat distrust, 3. Somewhat trust, 4. Trust completely ∙ Do you know about NHIF? ∙ How much do you think NHIF costs per year? ∙ How do you pay your medical bills? (3 main sources maximum)

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Keywords