The Effects of Noncompetes on Workers and Employers

How to cite

Cowgill, Bo; Starr, Evan. 2020. "The Effects of Noncompetes on Workers and Employers." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006906. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6906-1.3

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Bo Cowgill* , Evan Starr

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006906
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6906-1.3
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2023-05-23 – 2023-11-01
Countries
United States of America ()
JEL codes
J42, M5, J31, J41, K31, L41, C93
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6906

Abstract

The goal of our study is to causally estimate of the effects of noncompetes themselves on the employment outcomes of workers. To do this, we propose to run a large field experiment where we work alongside an employer to randomly assign noncompetes and their salience, as well as wage offers, to examine how the assignment of noncompetes affects individual willingness to accept a job offer. We can also examine subsequent employment outcomes for the workers, and even directly test the worker’s willingness to violate the noncompete by working with a second employer seeking to hire the workers.

Intervention

We propose to work with a firm to hire professional HR workers, who will be tasked with reviewing and screening resumes. For HR workers who respond to our job ad, our experimental design involves three dimensions of randomization. In the job offer we will randomly assign the use of a noncompete, the salience of the noncompete, and wages. We describe these more in the hidden fields in order to keep the interventions private from potential subjects.

Experimental design

For HR workers who respond to the job ad, our experimental design involves three dimensions of randomization related to the job offer. We describe these more in the hidden fields in order to keep the interventions private from potential subjects.

Design details

Randomization method
We will randomize using a computer script and a random number generator.
Randomization unit
The randomization will occur at the individual level.
Clusters
We expect to hire approximately 2080 workers. Anticipating a 20-25% acceptance rate, this is approximately 8-10k workers in the initial outreach.
Observations
It depends on the stage of the experiment. At the outset, we hope to hire 2080 individuals, out of approximately 10k job offers.
Arms
In the second stage, we expect to have: 240 individuals in each of the 2 control conditions without noncompetes. 400 individuals in each of the 4 treatment conditions with noncompetes.
Primary outcomes
The outcomes we aim to measure from the first randomization are below: --Job Acceptance and Wages: We then measure who accepts the job offer. The randomization permits us to infer the effects of noncompete agreements on the composition of hired workers, the job acceptance rate, compensating differentials for noncompetes, and the length of employer search. -- Performance. For workers who accept the job, we will send recruiting work and instructions to review sixteen resumes or job applications. We will measure who complies with these instructions for all workers as a measure of their quality. Exploiting the salience intervention allows us to address selection into second-stage performance. Other outcomes we aim to measure are below: -Other Employment Experiences and Earnings: During the prohibited noncompete period (6 months), we will also gather information from the platform on other work that the worker has completed (i.e., number of other employers) and their cumulative earnings. We will supplement this information with any new information on their LinkedIn profile related to employment. -Testing Willingness to Violate the Noncompete: During the prohibited noncompete period (6 months), we will assume the role of a poaching firm and reach out to the workers we hired previously. We will make them a job offer to measure if (a) those bound by noncompetes are less willing to accept our offer, and (b) whether they require higher wages to violate the provision.

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Keywords