Deliberative Democracy and Resource Rents in Tanzania

How to cite

Sandefur, Justin; Fishkin, James; Moyo, Mujobu; Birdsall, Nancy. 2015. "Deliberative Democracy and Resource Rents in Tanzania." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000689. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.689-5.0

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Justin Sandefur* , James Fishkin , Mujobu Moyo , Nancy Birdsall

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0000689
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.689-5.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2015-01-27 – 2015-10-25
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D7, H5, O1, Q3
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/689

Abstract

In 2010, Tanzania discovered natural gas reserves off its southern coast worth roughly fifteen times its annual GDP at prevailing prices. The large literature on the resource curse suggests this new gas discovery brings considerable risks to a low-income country with already weak governance institutions. How should Tanzania manage this new revenue to avoid the traditional resource curse? We will report on multiple rounds of a nationally representative opinion poll soliciting ordinary Tanzanians' views on how to manage and spend gas revenues. Between polling rounds, a random subset of poll respondents will receive detailed information about the natural gas discovery, and the pros and cons of various gas policy options. A randomly drawn subset of individuals receiving the information treatment will be invited to a national deliberative event, where they will debate gas policy options and participate in question and answer sessions with experts. We will report treatment effects of information and deliberation on support for alternative uses of gas revenue, including saving versus spending, and direct distribution of resource rents. We will also test a number of hypotheses about the process of deliberation itself, related to peer effects, leader effects, and polarization.

Intervention

The experiment includes two interventions. The deliberation treatment will happen after registration of this trial. The information treatment is of secondary importance (primarily intended to measure mechanisms underlying effects of the deliberation treatment) but comes first chronologically, and has already taken place at the time of registration.

1. Information treatment

A random subset of poll respondents will receive detailed information about the natural gas discovery, and the pros and cons of various gas policy options. The information will be provided in the form of a roughly thirty-minute video, screened in the field by survey teams after the baseline poll. The video aims to provide a balanced view of controversial alternatives, and is based on a script written with input and approval from a panel of researchers, Tanzanian industry representatives, civil society leaders, and politicians spanning all three major political parties as well as relevant government agencies.

2. Deliberation treatment

A randomly drawn subset of individuals receiving the information treatment will be invited to a national deliberative event. The event will be held over two days in April 2015, in Dar es Salaam, with travel and accommodation provided by the project. At the event, poll respondents will participate in small group deliberations about specific gas policy options, followed by question and answer sessions with experts.

Experimental design

A nationally representative baseline poll asked a target sample of 2,000 adult Tanzanians in 200 rural and urban clusters about their knowledge and policy preferences regarding Tanzania's recent natural gas discovery and the use of any future revenues. All respondents received a free mobile phone to enable follow-up polling by phone.

In each of 100 randomly selected survey clusters, 7 of 10 respondents were invited to view a documentary video presenting pros and cons of various gas policy options (the information treatment). Of the respondents who were invited to the information treatment, 4 individuals were invited to a democratic deliberation about the use of the natural gas.

The 400 invitees to the deliberative event will be divided into 25 randomly assigned small groups to discuss a sequence of gas policy options. The discussions will be broken into four rounds, and groups will be randomly reassigned after each round.

Follow-up polling will measure the medium term (i.e., weeks rather than hours after treatment) impact of information and deliberation on respondents' knowledge and policy preferences. Follow-up polling will be conducted by phone and broken into multiple rounds, due to limitations on respondents' attention span on the phone.

Design details

Randomization method
Both clusters and individuals were randomly assigned to treatment arms by one of the PIs on a computer in the office using Stata.
Randomization unit
1. Cluster level randomization: The survey spans 200 primary sampling units (PSUs). We use the terms cluster and PSU interchangeably here. Of these 100 clusters, individuals chosen to participate in the information and deliberation treatments will be drawn exclusively from 100 treatment clusters. In rural areas, clusters are defined as a sub-village or hamlet (kitongoji). In urban areas, clusters are defined as a block or sub-ward (mtaa). Ten individual poll respondents were sampled from each PSU. 2. Individual level randomization: Within the 100 treatment clusters, individual participants for the information treatment and deliberation treatment will be drawn at random. (For the information treatment, this will include 7 of 10 individuals in each treatment cluster. For the deliberation treatment, this will include 4 of 10 individuals in each treatment cluster, a strict subset of the information treatment group.) 3. Random formation of deliberative groups. The 400 individuals to be invited to the deliberative event will be assigned to small groups to deliberate on policy options. Assuming perfect compliance (i.e., all invitees attend the event), participants will be assigned to 25 groups of 16 people. The event will span four rounds of deliberation. Groups will be randomly reassigned for each of the four rounds. The random assignment of moderators to deliberative groups is implicit in this design.
Clusters
200 primary sampling units (sub-villages or "vitongoji" in rural areas; blocks or "mitaa" in urban areas)
Observations
2,000 individuals
Arms
Pure control clusters = 100 Treatment clusters = 100 Within treatment clusters: Information treatment = 700 individuals, 7 per treatment cluster Deliberation treatment = 400 individuals, 4 per treatment cluster (subset of info treatment arm) Control group within treatment clusters = 300 individuals, 3 per treatment cluster
Primary outcomes
The main outcome variables are based on poll responses about preferences for how to manage or spend natural gas revenues. These include: 1. Support for extracting and exporting natural gas 2. Support for saving rather than spending gas revenue 3. Support for government spending versus direct distribution of rents 4. Support for government spending on social services versus infrastructure, transport, and industry 5. Support for transparency and oversight of gas revenues, or additional restrictions on their use We will also examine treatment effects on survey responses measuring: 6. Knowledge of the natural gas discovery

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Keywords