Strategic avoidance of lying costs

How to cite

Parra, Daniel. 2020. "Strategic avoidance of lying costs." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006881. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6881-1.3000000000000003

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Daniel Parra*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006881
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6881-1.3000000000000003
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2020-12-18 – 2020-12-31
Countries
Germany (Online via Prolific with no distinction of nationality.)
JEL codes
C91; C79; D91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6881

Abstract

I study whether people take advantage of privileged positions to have someone lying on their behalf without explicit delegation. I use a sequential cheating game in dyads in which if at least one member of the dyad lie, both benefit from it. Consequently, the first-mover can avoid the cost of lying by reporting truthfully if he or she expects that the second-mover will lie. I use treatment variations to eliminate the belief of the second-mover lying, control for the positive externality of the first-mover lie, and control for simultaneous decisions.

Intervention

I study whether people take advantage of privileged positions to have someone lying on their behalf without explicit delegation.

Experimental design

I use a variation of the observed game presented by Gneezy et al. (2018). In my game, two participants play sequentially. In the beginning, the first-mover (P1) click on a box in the computer, and a color (Orange or Black) is revealed. The probability of drawing Orange is 0.2 and black 0.8. After the first-mover observes the draw, they are asked to report the observed color to the second-mover (P2). Once the second-mover learns this report, they are asked to click on a box in the computer that reveals a color; the second mover reports the observed color. The probabilities of drawing each color are the same as for the first-mover.

It is important to mention that the draw is only known by the participant and the experimenter, but not by other participants. Participants' payoffs depend on both the reports of the two members of a dyad. In particular, if any of the two participants report an Orange, both of them get 4 pounds. Otherwise, both gain 0.5 pounds. I use this payoff structure because I am interested in the extensive margin.

In the Baseline, I hypothesized that the first-movers will take advantage of their position and, therefore, will avoid the cost of lying. To attribute truth-telling to the possibility of having another participant lying on their behalf, I make the report of the second mover a random variable instead of a decision made by P2. Specifically, in the treatment No Avoidance, after the second-mover learns the report of P1, he or she clicks on a button that draws a color, and the computer reports the actual value automatically. Thus, in No Avoidance, the first-mover can not rely on second-mover incentives to lie.

In No Avoidance, the only thing that changes compared with the Baseline is the beliefs about the second-mover report. However, I am interested in knowing whether this result will hold even when dropping the positive externality generated by the first-mover’s report. With the previous treatments, I do not know whether the report in No Externalityis purely by the fact that it is not possible to use P2 as an implicit agent or because P1 is using the handy excuse of causing a benefit on P2. In other words, it may be the case that in the Baseline, the first-mover is not using the positive externality as a justification because both participants generate positive externalities and then take full advantage of their position. In contrast, in No Avoidancethe positive impact of P1’s report is more salient.

Hence, in the treatment No Externality, I modify the payoff scheme to eliminate the positive externality generated by P1 in previous treatments. In No Externality, the game sequence and main game features, including the pecuniary payoffs for the first-mover, are identical to those in No Avoidance. However, the payoff for P2 depends only on the color chosen by the computer. Specifically, if Orange, he or she gets 4 pounds; otherwise, he or she gets 0.5 pounds.

In No Avoidance and No Externality, I control for different components that can explain why the first-mover decides to report truthfully in Baseline. However, there is another component that worth ruling out: the fact that participants play sequentially. In this treatment, Simultaneous, participants decide at the same time which color to report. The impact of this treatment on first-mover strategy is similar to No Avoidance. However, it allows me to understand the role of the moral signal that the first mover sends about whether it is correct to lie or not. Thus, this treatment makes it possible to confirm the first-mover’s willingness to avoid the cost of lying and the impact of the moral signal on second-mover behavior.

Design details

Randomization method
The code of the experiment randomly assigns treatment.
Randomization unit
Individual-level.
Clusters
120 dyads for sequential treatments and 60 for simultaneous. I assume that in simultaneous, given that participants decide without knowing what the other has decided, I can use the report of both participants in the group as identical. Then, I will only need to collect half of the dyads compared with other treatments. There is the possibility that the second player left the game given that they can get tired of waiting for the first-mover decision. In these cases, a robot will take decisions on behalf of P2. I will not exclude these observations from the analysis, because arguably this does not change the decision because they only learn whether their partner dropped-out after making their decisions.
Observations
840 participants.
Arms
120 dyads Baseline 120 dyads No avoidance 120 dyads No externality 60 dyads Simultaneous
Primary outcomes
Whether participants lie or not.
Secondary outcomes
beliefs about the second player's report.
Sponsors
Name: WZB Berlin Social Science Center Location: Berlin Url: https://www.wzb.eu/de

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Keywords