Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying

How to cite

Labonne, Julien; Keefer, Philip; Cruz, Cesi. 2015. "Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000688. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.688-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Julien Labonne* , Philip Keefer , Cesi Cruz

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0000688
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.688-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2013-03-01 – 2015-06-30
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/688

Abstract

The project assess the effects of voter information on vote buying and incumbent advantage. The intervention was designed with and implemented by the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV). We collected data from candidates on their proposed policies and platforms and distributed that information in brochures to voters in randomly selected villages ahead of the May 13, 2013 mayoral elections in the Philippines. These brochures and the household visits by PPCRV volunteers to distribute and explain the brochures increased voter information about the types of public good provision that mayors could provide and to inform them of the availability of a large fund to finance provision of municipal public goods.

The intervention (and pre-analysis plan) were registered on the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) hypothesis registry on May 12, 2013.

Experimental design

The randomization was done at the village-level (within municipalities).

In April 2013, we interviewed every candidate for mayor in twelve municipalities in the provinces of Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur, in the northern reaches of the Philippines. Candi- date names were taken from the official list of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). In the course of the interview, we gave each candidate a worksheet with a list of sectors. Candidates were told the average amount that they would have to spend from their local development fund (LDF) and asked to allocate money across sectors.

PPCRV volunteers distributed that information in brochures to voters in randomly selected villages ahead of the May 13, 2013 mayoral elections. These brochures and the household visits by PPCRV staff to distribute and explain the brochures increased voter information about the types of public good provision that mayors could provide and to inform them of the availability of a large fund to finance provision of municipal public goods.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer. Within each target municipality, villages were allocated to the treatment and control groups using a pairwise matching algorithm. First, for all potential pairs, the Mahalanobis distance was computed using village-level data on population, number of registered voters, the number of precincts, a rural dummy, turnout in the 2010 municipal election and incumbent vote share in the 2010 elections. Second, among 5,000 randomly selected partitions, the partition that minimized the total sum of Mahalanobis distance between villages in the same pairs was selected. Third, within each pair, a village was randomly selected to be allocated to treatment; the other one serving as control.
Randomization unit
The randomization unit is the village
Clusters
The sample consists of 284 villages (142 treatment and 142 control) in 12 municipalities
Observations
Data were collected on 12 households per village
Arms
NA
Primary outcomes
As specified in the pre-analysis plan the key outcome variables are: political knowledge, salience of local development spending on voting decisions, turnout, vote share and vote buying

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords