Self-serving norm acquisition
How to cite
Breuer, Kevin; Feldhaus, Christoph. 2020. "Self-serving norm acquisition." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006865. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6865-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Recently spectator designs have become a popular tool in a variety of different fields of experimental economics. Examples include repugnance, ethics, cooperation, privacy and paternalism. In such experiments third parties serve as observers, judges, punishers or choice architects. In this project we are investigating how roles affect behavior. Do first- and third-parties react differently to norm information? Do first- and third-parties differ in the type of norm (i.e. injunctive or descriptive) they choose to acquire and follow?
Experimental design
Dictator Game in take-frame and beforehand provision of norm information. Decision-Maker (DM) distributes money between himself and unknown charity. Choice-Architect (CA) might costly restrict choice set of DM.
2 x 2 Treatment Design (dimensions: (DM,CA),(High,Low))
"DM" treatments: DM taking decision is implemented with "low" (1%) or "high" (99%) probability. No choice set restriction by CA (only observes decision of DM).
"CA" treatments: DM taking decision is implemented with certainty. CA choice set restriction is implemented with "low" (1%) or "high" (99%) probability.
Design details
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