Reciprocity: Warm glow or guilt aversion?
How to cite
Kerzenmacher, Florian; Feess, Eberhard. 2020. "Reciprocity: Warm glow or guilt aversion?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006836. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6836-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We utilize the trust game to investigate in an online experiment whether trustees (receivers) who send money back are rather motivated by positive feelings such as warm glow or by avoiding negative feelings such as guilt. In the trust game itself, distinguishing between altruism and guilt aversion is senseless as both higher levels of altruism and higher levels of guilt aversion motivate the receiver to return higher amounts. However, distinguishing between the two kinds of motivations is important when receivers can opt out from the trust game. Specifically, we have developed a behavioral game theoretic model that yields the following main result: If reciprocal behavior is motivated by guilt aversion (warm glow), then those who return higher amounts have a higher (lower) incentive to opt out. Distinguishing between warm glow and guilt aversion is hence important to understand if and why subjects who self-select or who are randomly assigned to situations where trust matters behave more or less trustworthy. A pilot with 200 subjects suggests that reciprocity seems to be motivated by positive emotions (warm glow) rather than by avoiding negative emotions (guilt).
Experimental design
The experiment will be conducted online and participants will be recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Subjects will be randomly assigned to groups of two. The two group members are randomly assigned the roles of trustor (sender) and trustee (receiver).
In addition to the participation fee, trustors receive $0.50. They have to decide whether they want to keep this amount or send it to the trustee. If they decide to give it to the trustee, the amount is tripled and the trustee receives $1.50. The trustee can then decide how much money to send back to the trustor (between $0 and $1.50).
The amount the trustee wants to send back will be elicited according to the strategy method assuming that the trustor has sent the money. After trustees make their decision, they will be given an exit option. If they decide to not play the trust game, they receive a certain payment of $0.50 in addition to their participation fee. In this case, trustors simply keep their additional $0.50.
Following this baseline setting, we plan to conduct another treatment in which trustees are informed about the frequency of trustors sending the money in the previous treatment in order to fix beliefs.
Design details
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