Round-Number Effects in Bargaining: Bias vs. Focal Point
How to cite
Lauf, Alexander; Schlereth, Lars. 2020. "Round-Number Effects in Bargaining: Bias vs. Focal Point." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006823. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6823-1.1
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
It is well-established that round numbers play an important role in bargaining situations. In a first step, using data from Backus, Blake and Tadelis (2019) we show that a large fraction of successful negotiations end with a round price, and that round final prices are associated with quicker agreement. These effects might be driven by a simple preference for round numbers or by round numbers serving as focal points. In a second step, we design a theory-guided experiment to disentangle these explanations. To this end, we plan to run two treatments on Amazon MTurk with roughly 1000 participants. In treatment One, a single decision-maker might be affected by round-number bias. Treatment Two extends the setting in a one-change-at-a-time fashion to two-player bargaining where additionally round numbers as focal points might facilitate coordination. Comparing these two treatments allows to differentiate between the two explanations.
Experimental design
We deploy a multi-period bargaining game with a shrinking-cake design. There are two treatment groups. Each participant makes a total of 10 decisions to accept or reject a random offer.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.