Common Ownership and Firm Strategic Behaviour
How to cite
Frey, Jonas; Ockenfels, Axel; Schmalz, Martin. 2020. "Common Ownership and Firm Strategic Behaviour." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006817. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6817-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We study the production decisions of managers in an experimental Cournot market as a function of the ownership structure of the experimental firms as well as of a variety of corporate governance mechanisms. In the baseline, the primary outcomes are managerial choices of production output and the market outcome in terms of product prices. In later settings, the choice of compensation structure, communication, and shareholdings are outcomes.
The objective is to research which governance mechanisms are important in translating changes in ownership structure to changes in firm behaviour. We also aim to evaluate a variety of policy proposals, including researching which ownership structures endogenously emerge when restrictions on voting rights are implemented.
In the baseline, there are two firms, managed by two experimental managers and owned by two shareholders. Managers choose production quantities. Shareholdings are exogenously assigned at first, and in later trials endogenously chosen by experimental shareholders. Ownership structure can either be divided (each shareholder owns 100% of one firm) or common (each shareholder owns 50% of both firms). In terms of governance mechanisms, we study, among others, doing nothing (other than information about shareholdings), management compensation (exogenously assigned, and later endogenously chosen by shareholders); communication between shareholders and firms (dito); as well as policy interventions (restrictions on voting rights for diversified investors).
In future trials, we plan to also allow for dynamic considerations, social interactions, relative performance comparisons of managers, and other variations.
In the first set of 6 experiments, we first vary just shareholdings. Compensation are fixed (not depending on firm profits) in one subset of settings, or alternatively based on the profit of only one or two firms (set so that managers maximise their own salary by maximising the profit of both firms rather than just their own firm), in the alternative treatments. We will run one session per treatment.
We have no eligibility criteria and are interested in a general population. In follow-up trials, we will recruit economics students and industry professionals to play the same games, to investigate external validity. In all trials, we will examine gender differences.
We will recruit 400 subjects per treatment for a total of 2400 subjects.
Intervention
In our laboratory experiment two subjects in the role of managers will decide how much to produce in a Cournot market. The companies which they manage are owned by two subjects in the role of shareholders. Managers can choose to either produce the quantity that is the optimal choice under Cournot competition (33 in our experiment) or halve of the optimal monopoly quantity (25 in our experiment).
In the baseline treatment managers will receive a fixed salary and each shareholder will own 100% of one firm. We will have two forms of treatment interventions. First, we will vary the ownership and have treatments in which each of the two shareholders owns 50% of each firm. This changes the decision that maximises the shareholders’ profit. With divided ownership the shareholders only care about the profit of their firm and they want their managers to compete aggressively and produce the Cournot quantity. Under common ownership each shareholder is indifferent about which firm makes the profit so they would prefer if their managers behave like a monopolist and produce halve of the monopoly quantity.
Just because the ownership changes the incentives of the shareholders, this does not necessarily mean that managers adjust their behaviour to act in the shareholders’ interest. Incentives may be needed to change behaviour. In the baseline treatment mangers receive a fixed salary. In additional treatments managers will get either a share of their own firms profits or a share of both firms’ profit. The first should induce them to produce more, to maximise their own firms profit and the second should induce them to produce less to raise the combined profit of both firms.
This leads to 6 treatments which we are going to test initially
• Divided ownership, fixed salary
• Common ownership, fixed salary
• Divided ownership, incentives based on the profit of the own firm
• Common ownership, incentives based on the profit of the own firm
• Divided ownership, incentives based on the profit of both firms
• Common ownership, incentives based on the profit of both firms
We have plans for future treatments.
In those treatments we will
• Test if communication matters by allowing shareholders to either
o Choose between pre specified messages asking the managers to produce more, the same amount or less
o Allow managers to freely talk to managers
• Allow shareholders to choose the incentives of the managers
In addition to studying variation in the outcome measure that depends on our interventions, we may also examine if there are differences based on the demographics of the subjects (e.g. their gender). This analysis will be exploratory, and we do not have a prior hypothesis about any demographics related effects. We may also study the dynamics of the experiment by examining if subjects behave differently in different rounds of the experiment.
Experimental design
We will run a computerised experiment in which two managers decide how much of a good their firm produces. The price in the market depends inversely on the total production by both firms. Producing more will therefore raise the profit of the managers own firm but will decrease the profit of the other firm and the market as a whole. We are interested in the production decisions of the managers. We will start by running 6 treatments, which are described in detail in the “Intervention” section. In the treatments we will vary ownership and incentives of the manager. The experiment will be programmed using oTree and subjects complete the experiment in their web browser. We intend to recruit subjects via prolific, an online subject pool for academic and market research. We may also use subjects from amazons mechanical turk or run laboratory experiments in the future to validate our results in different samples. Each of the 6 treatments will have 200 managers and 200 sharehodlers for a total of 2400 subjects. Subjects will have the opportunity to earn additional compensation beyond their show up fee. The additional compensation depends on their salary (manager) or the firm’s profit (shareholder). We will select one of the 10 rounds which subjects play at random and pay subjects depending on the result from this round.
Design details
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