Gender pay transparency
How to cite
Marandola, Ginevra; Baggio, Marianna. 2020. "Gender pay transparency." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006712. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6712-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study aims at identifying the effects of different policy options to support the proper enforcement of the equal pay principle.
We will implement an incentivized online experiment in three EU member states: Poland, Spain, and Germany. Further, two samples within each member state are being recruited: a representative sample of the employed adult population, and a sample of HR professionals and managers. The first sample, representing employees in the experiment, will be representative in terms of age, gender, and region. The second sample, representing employers in the experiment, will be drawn from a cross-section of sectors and companies of different sizes and will be balanced in terms of gender.
Employees and employers will form a company and they will take decisions affecting each other's payoffs. In particular, employers will know the gender and have incomplete information about the potential performance of prospective employees. Employers will set the wages and career promotions under a budgetary constraint. Employees will work for their employers, deciding the level of effort they wish to exert, and receive a wage in exchange.
The experimental methodology translates real policy options into the following experimental conditions:
- Option 0: No change of policy (baseline scenario).
- Option 1: Right of employees to information on pay levels. Employees receive information on their wage and position, how many men and women work in the company, and the average wage overall and by gender, but only for their position. This information will be provided automatically.
- Option 2: Reporting on Pay. Employees receive information on their wage and position, how many men and women work in the company and in each position, and the average wage overall and by gender, for each position in the company.
The study aims at investigating the following outcome variables:
– Average level of gender pay discrimination under each treatment (employer’s behaviour);
– Employees productivity and inferred effort;
– Employee’s (costly) action against employer (contentiousness).
At the end of the experiment a post-experimental survey will be administered to respondents. The post-experimental survey consists of a set of closed general socio-demographic questions, not sensitive in nature (i.e. gender, age, employment status, hours worked per week, education). Furthermore, a number of behavioural measures, such ask risk preferences, fairness, reciprocity, and intrinsic motivation, are included. Lastly, the elicitation of beliefs on own and others performance, as well as others strategic behaviour, will be incorporated by means of incentivised introspection.
Intervention
Employees and employers will form a company and affect each other payoffs by making a set of choices. In particular, employers will know the gender and have incomplete information about the potential performance of prospective employees. The incomplete information is based on a screening test that places employees into either Group A or B, depending on whether their performance is better or worse that a defined threshold. Employers will also set the wages and career promotions under a budgetary constraint. Employees will work for their employers, deciding the level of effort they wish to exert, and receive a wage in exchange. Under certain circumstances employees can ask for compensation for unfair treatment.
The devised labour market experiment translates policy options in the following treatments:
- T0: No change of policy (baseline scenario). Employees only know their wage and position and how many men and women work in the company overall. After receiving this information, they are asked if they want to ask for compensation and then they perform the main task.
- T1: Right of employees to information on pay levels. Employees receive information on their wage and position, how many men and women work in the company, and the average wage overall and by gender, but only for their position. This information is provided automatically. After receiving this information, they are asked if they want to ask for compensation and then they perform the main task.
- T2: Reporting on Pay. Employees receive information on their wage and position, how many men and women work in the company, and the average wage overall and by gender in the managerial position and the clerical position. On the basis of this additional information they can request for compensation. They then perform the main task.
In each treatment, employers assign wages and positions twice. The first time they do not receive any feedback on the information available to employees and on their ability to ask for compensation. The second time employers set wages and positions knowing about employees' ability to ask for compensation and knowing employees' level of information about others' wages and positions (treatments).
Experimental design
In each Country the participants are:
-900 employees
-150 employers
One employer will be asked to make decisions referring to 18 employees, leading to a final match by random draw to six employees (for the purpose of calculating the final payment). the 6 employees will perform a task and make some decisions that will affect their employer's payoffs.
There will be 2 experiments:
1. First the one with the employers [EXP1], and once this will be finalized
2. The one with employees (for which the results of EXP1 are necessary) [EXP2]
Employers are asked to set wages for 6 groups of 3 employees (18 profiles). They will also have the possibility to promote 3 of the 18 employees to a managerial position. The wage set for the clerical employees can be high or low, employers have a budget constraint and they cannot assign the high wage to all the employees. The employer knows the gender of the employees and their performance in a screening test, which is similar to the main task the employees will perform. According to the performance in the screening test employees will be assigned to group A (higher or equal than the threshold ) or group B (lower than the threshold). The threshold is the median performance in the pilot.
The task (string task by Isen and Reeve, 2006) has the following key characteristics:
• Not gender stereotypical;
• Real effort task (for the measurement of productivity and inferred effort);
• Allows for “categories” (i.e. managerial/clerical) to which different thresholds for completing the task apply.
Employers get paid based on employees' performance in the task. Employers know that employees can ask for compensation if they think that they were not given a fair wage. A compensation is granted when colleagues who performed better or equal in the screening test receive a higher wage than the one of the employee asking for compensation.
In the treatments, employers are asked to set the wages and positions knowing that:
T0: employees only know their wage and position and are clueless about their wage being high or low
T1: employees know their wage and position and they know the average wage, also by gender, in their own position
T2: employees know their wage and position and they know the average wage, also by gender, in their own position and the number of men and women in the managerial position and their wage.
Under the information set described in T0, T1, T2 employees perform the screening test, the main task and can ask for compensation. In the main task employees need to reach a threshold to get their wage. They can also work beyond the threshold with the purpose to increase the employer's earnings knowing that this extra work will not affect their payoffs.
Design details
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