Content Matters: The Effects of Commitment Requests on Truth-Telling
How to cite
Rincke, Johannes; Glogowsky, Ulrich; Cagala, Tobias. 2020. "Content Matters: The Effects of Commitment Requests on Truth-Telling." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006700. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6700-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This RCT is a replication excercise regarding the cheating game considered in the working paper version of Cagala, Tobias; Glogowsky, Ulrich; Rincke, Johannes (2019, "Content Matters: The Effects of Commitment Requests on Truth-Telling" (for a pdf of the working paper, see Docs and Materials). The original study uses a laboratory experiment to test how the request to sign a nocheating declaration affects truth-telling. Its main finding is that the effects strongly depend on the declaration’s content. Signing a no-cheating declaration increases truth-telling if it is morally charged, does not affect behavior if it is morally neutral, and reduces truth-telling if it is morally neutral and threatens to punish. The latter effect is driven by subjects with particularly high values on Hong’s Psychological Reactance Scale. These are subjects with a tendency to push back if their freedom of choice is restricted. We aim to replicate the original design with three main changes: First, we would like to increase the statistical power of the analysis. Specifically, we aim at collecting 600 individual observations. Second, we plan to embed survey questions aiming at the measurement of subjects' reactance score in a larger survey including the Big 5 personality traits. Third, we plan to collect the experimental data online. This change relative to the original design is due to the fact that laboratories in Germany are currently closed because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Intervention
Subjects play a standard cheating game. A random draw determines a number between 1 and 6. Subjects receive an additional payoff of 5 Euro if they report a 5, and no additional payoff if they report any other number. At the beginning of the experimental sessions, subjects in the treatment groups sign a no-cheating declaration (control group: no declaration, so signature). The content of the declaration varies between a version referring to the standards of ethical sound behavior (ETHICAL STANDARD), a morally neutral version that does not refer to any ethically loaded norm (NEUTRAL), and a version combining the neutral no-cheating declaration with a threat that non-compliance will be sanctioned (SANCTION). Note that in the replication, we plan to collect the data online.
Experimental design
Subjects play a standard cheating game. A random draw determines a number between 1 and 6. Subjects receive an additional payoff of 5 Euro if they report a 5, and no additional payoff if they report any other number. At the beginning of the experimental sessions, subjects in the treatment groups sign a no-cheating declaration (control group: no declaration, so signature). The content of the declaration varies between a version referring to the standards of ethical sound behavior (ETHICAL STANDARD), a morally neutral version that does not refer to any ethically loaded norm (NEUTRAL), and a version combining the neutral no-cheating declaration with a threat that non-compliance will be sanctioned (SANCTION). We study the heterogeneity of cheating with respect to the subjects' psychologocal reactance score. The reactance score is constrcuted using survey data collected before the experiment. Note that in the replication, we plan to collect all data online.
Design details
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