Increasing consumer surplus through a novel product testing mechanism

How to cite

Vollstaedt, Ulrike. 2020. "Increasing consumer surplus through a novel product testing mechanism." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006685. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6685-3.1

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Ulrike Vollstaedt*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006685
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6685-3.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2017-01-10 – 2020-11-24
Countries
Germany ()
JEL codes
C72, C91, D82, L15
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6685

Abstract

Our study proposes a novel mechanism to reduce information asymmetry about product quality between buyers and sellers. Product testing organizations like Consumer Reports (US) and Stiftung Warentest (Germany) seek to reduce this asymmetry by providing credible information. However, limited capacity leads to testing of only a select number of product models, often bestsellers, which can yield suboptimal information. After outlining our mechanism, we develop a game to derive testable predictions. We show theoretically that a unique Nash equilibrium exists in which our mechanism yields optimal information, equivalent to a world of complete information, while selecting bestsellers does not. Subsequently, we confirm experimentally that our mechanism increases consumer surplus.

Experimental design

We design four experimental treatments. The first two represent currently used product model selection mechanisms (called BESTSELLERS), the latter two represent our new product model selection mechanism (called SELLERS APPLY).

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done by a computer
Randomization unit
experimental session as one level of randomization (regarding which treatment), individual as a second level of randomization (regarding whether an a person participates as a seller or buyer, and with which ID)
Clusters
25 experimental sessions
Observations
575 participants
Arms
Bestsellers-WorstCase: 5 experimental sessions, Bestsellers-Random: 5 experimental sessions, SellersApply-LyingPoss: 5 experimental sessions, SellersApply-Truth: 10 experimental sessions
Primary outcomes
consumer surplus

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords