Partisanship, Information, and Policy Preferences
How to cite
Wen, Jaya; Tabellini, Marco. 2020. "Partisanship, Information, and Policy Preferences." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006665. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6665-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Since the early 2000s, political polarization has skyrocketed among US voters, who are now more divided than ever on a diverse array of social, cultural, and economic issues (Abramowitz, 2018; Gentzkow, 2016; Klein, 2020). Political identity is powerful enough to govern the behavior and the preferences of Americans on both sides of the political spectrum. Recent studies have shown that, due to partisan identification, voters may support policies that oppose their own economic interests (Bonomi et al., 2020; Dokshin, 2020; Grossman and Helpman, 2019). This paper will test whether political identity distorts voters’ responses to new information in the context of healthcare policies in the US. We will conduct an online survey experiment in which we cross-randomize exposure to i) an information treatment on life expectancy in the US (compared to other countries, over time) and ii) a partisan prime and document how these two forces influence voter preferences, beliefs, and values.
Intervention
We will implement two cross-cutting interventions:
i) An information treatment revealing the performance of U.S. life expectancy over time, compared to other countries
ii) A series of questions designed to prime partisan identity
Experimental design
Our experimental design involves two cross-cutting treatment groups, one with two arms, and one with three. In total, we will therefore have six unique treatment cells. Individuals will be randomized into one of these six cells, with randomization stratified by gender and race.
All individuals will take a 15-minute online survey. No identifying information will be collected.
The first group of treatment arms, which we call “PA”, varies whether or not we prime individuals with their party affiliation. In treatment arm PA = 0, we do not prime individuals, and in PA = 1, we do. The prime takes the form of two survey questions, which asks respondents about their affiliation and remind them of the efficacy of partisan affiliation as a lens of political decisions.
The second group of treatment arms, which we call “INFO”, varies whether or not respondents receive information about the United States’ true performance in the dimension of life expectancy compared to the other G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom). For INFO = 0, no information is given. For INFO = 1, national averages are given. And for INFO = 2, respondents see both the US average and an own-demographic average (based on the respondent’s gender and race).
The order of the survey will proceed as follows. It will begin with the elicitation of consent and priors about where the United States falls in life expectancy rank among the G7. Then, for PA = 1, we will administer the partisan prime. Afterward, we will implement the information treatments. Finally, we will ask four survey modules of all participants: policy preferences, beliefs, behaviors, and demographics. We will randomly alternate the order in which we elicit beliefs over the determinants of life expectancy and policy preferences. This randomization allows us to measure the importance of mechanism priming in determining policy preferences.
Design details
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