Gender and Microfinance 'Lab-in-the-field' Experiment

How to cite

Mukherjee, Shagata. 2020. "Gender and Microfinance 'Lab-in-the-field' Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006594. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6594-1.0

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Shagata Mukherjee*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006594
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6594-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2016-01-01 – 2016-05-01
Countries
India (North-East)
JEL codes
O12, C93, D03, G21, J16
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6594

Abstract

While the universal policy of gender targeting in microfinance stems, inter alia, from the conventional wisdom that women are better credit risks, there has been little research on the underlying reasons for it. This study aims to contribute to that research gap by conducting microfinance lab-in-the-field or artefactual field experiments in comparable matrilineal and patrilineal societies in rural India to exploit the natural variation in social norms across these societies.

Intervention

The intervention is a microfinance 'lab-in-the-field' or artefactual field experiment that is conducted with the matrilineal Khasi society in Meghlaya and two patrilineal societies in the neighbouring states of Assam and West Bengal.

Experimental design

The experimental design incorporates two treatments- individual and group liability game treatment. In the individual game, each person receives a loan and decides to invest it between a relatively safer project with a lower return and a riskier project with a higher return. If the chosen project is successful, the individual decides to repay her loan or to default strategically. In the group liability games, two individuals of the same gender are randomly matched and are liable for each other's loans. It means that both group members are liable if any one group member defaults. In the experiment, each group member receives a loan and decides independently to invest it between a relatively safer project and a riskier project, same as that in the individual game. If the project is successful, which is private information to the individual group members, they decide independently to contribute to the group repayment or default strategically. The experimental design also incorporates an investment risk (IR) task. In the IR task, subjects decide how much of their endowment to invest in a lottery that returns three times the amount invested or zero with equal probabilities.

Design details

Randomization method
Subjects are randomized into one of the two treatments-individual or group liability game treatment. The randomization was done using a computer.
Randomization unit
The unit of randomization is a subject who participated in the experiment.
Clusters
368 individual subjects
Observations
368 individual subjects
Arms
104 subjects in individual game treatment and 264 subjects in group game treatments. 184 subjects are male and 184 subjects are female. 136 subjects belong to matrilineal society in Meghlaya, 132 subjects belong to patrilineal society in Assam and 100 subjects belong to patrilineal society in West Bengal.
Primary outcomes
Loan Default Project Choice Repayment Choice (Strategic Default)
Secondary outcomes
Amount invested in the lottery

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Keywords