By chance or by choice: Biased attribution of others' outcomes (Online Experiments)

How to cite

Koh, Boon Han; Erkal, Nisvan; Gangadharan, Lata. 2020. "By chance or by choice: Biased attribution of others' outcomes (Online Experiments)." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006519. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6519-1.3

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Boon Han Koh* , Nisvan Erkal , Lata Gangadharan

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006519
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6519-1.3
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2020-10-08 – 2021-03-26
Countries
Australia ()
JEL codes
C92, D91, D81
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6519

Abstract

Decision makers in positions of power often make unobserved choices under risk and uncertainty. In many cases, they face a trade-off between maximizing their own payoff and those of other individuals. What inferences are made in such instances about their choices when only outcomes are observable?

In a previous laboratory experiment, we investigated whether outcomes are attributed to luck or choices. Our results reveal that attribution biases exist in the evaluation of good outcomes. On average, good outcomes are attributed more to luck as compared to bad outcomes. This asymmetry in the way good and bad outcomes are attributed implies that decision makers get too little credit for their successes. Importantly, the biases detected tend to be driven by those individuals who make the selfish choice themselves when placed in the role of the decision maker.

In this follow-up study, we investigate some of the mechanisms that may be driving these biases.

Experimental design

In the main task of the experiment (investment task), participants are divided into groups of three and assume the role of either the decision maker or a group member. Each group has one decision maker (DM) and two members. [Note: In the experiment, we refer to the DM as the “Leader” of the group.]

The DM makes an investment choice (either low or high investment) that affects the payoffs of themselves and their group members. Both investment options can either succeed or fail. The DM and each group member receive a high payoff if the chosen investment succeeds and a low payoff if it fails. A high investment is more costly to the DM, but it increases the chance that the investment succeeds.

The group members do not observe the DM’s investment choice, but they are asked to report their beliefs about the investment chosen by the DM. Specifically, members are asked to report their prior belief of the likelihood that the DM has chosen the high investment. Then, they are asked to report their posterior beliefs under two scenarios: (i) assuming that the investment has succeeded (i.e., good outcome) and (ii) assuming that the investment has failed (i.e., bad outcome).

Participants will participate in three identical rounds of the investment task, where the payoffs of the investment options vary across each round. Participants remain in the same group and roles for all rounds of the task.

Design details

Randomization method
Treatments are assigned at the session level. There are between 20 and 40 sessions in total (depending on session sizes), and treatment assignment for each session is pre-determined by the experimenters prior to the session. Participants are therefore assigned to treatments based on the session they have registered for. Since they do not know which treatments are assigned to each session, treatment assignment is essentially random. Within a given session, participants are randomly divided into groups of three for the investment task and groups of two for the dictator game by the experimental software (oTree). Participants’ roles within each group (DM and members for the investment task; dictator and recipient for the dictator game) are also determined randomly by the experimental software.
Randomization unit
The unit of randomization is at the individual participant level for both DMs and members. Participants are assigned to treatments individually based on the session they have registered for. Within each session, even though participants are divided into groups, they do not receive any feedback between any two rounds of the investment task, or between the investment task and the dictator game. They are also not given any information about the other participants in their group during the experiment. Hence, for our econometric analysis of participants’ behavior, we can assume that the unit of randomization is at the individual level.
Clusters
500
Observations
500
Arms
Treatment 1: 200 Treatment 2: 300
Primary outcomes
1. DMs’ decisions to choose the high investment option. 2. Members’ prior beliefs that the DM has chosen the high investment option. 3. Members’ posterior beliefs that the DM has chosen the high investment option, conditional on the investment succeeding (i.e., good outcome) and failing (i.e., bad outcome).

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Erkal, N., Gangadharan, L. & Koh, B.H. By chance or by choice? Biased attribution of others’ outcomes when social preferences matter. Exp Econ 25, 413–443 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09731-w

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Keywords