Inequality Aversion for Task Inequality and Payment Inequality
How to cite
Pan, Xiaofei; Xiao, Erte. 2020. "Inequality Aversion for Task Inequality and Payment Inequality." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006471. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6471-1.2000000000000002
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Research on inequality aversion has been largely focused on the unequal distribution of monetary payment. However, inequality in naturally occurring environments can take many different forms. One important example of this is the unequal working load. In organizations, employees may receive the same salary but unequal working load. This project compares the attitudes towards inequality in these two domains. We will also address whether men and women may view these two types of inequality differently.
Experimental design
Our design is a variation of the ultimatum game where one worker propose how to allocate the tasks (or payment), the other decides whether to accept it. When accepted, both will work on the task (or receive the payment) as proposed.
Design details
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