The Moral Costs of Production Externalities: An Experimental Analysis in a Workplace Setup
How to cite
Waibel, Joschka. 2020. "The Moral Costs of Production Externalities: An Experimental Analysis in a Workplace Setup." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006443. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6443-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Recent findings show that people care about the negative consequences their choices unfold on others. They often incur moral costs as they trade-off selfish motives against ethical concerns. However, these intrinsic costs are far from being steadfast and people often exploit moral wiggle room to justify selfish behavior in morally questionable situations. In this paper, we want to examine how employees react to the introduction of unethical but payoff-beneficial production externalities across different workplace settings. In our lab experiment, participants have the possibility to generate personal income for themselves by decoding letters in a simple real effort task. The explicit task compensation depends on the implemented production type. They either work under a high wage or under a low wage scheme. Working under the high wage, however, adversely affects the income of a passive third party. In particular, we are interested in whether employees justify selfish behavior (maximizing personal income under the production externality) across different workplace scenarios using a 2x2-treatment design.
Experimental design
In our lab experiment participants are randomly allocated into working groups of three - while each group consists of a randomly chosen manager and two regular employees. In the experiment, participants have the possibility to generate personal income by decoding letters in a simple real effort task (Erkral et al., 2011). The explicit compensation for each group member depends on the implemented production type. Production type “A” promises a high piece rate, while production type “B” offers a low piece rate. However, production under high compensation simultaneously creates a negative externality for a third passive party. Therefore, each participant who works under the high compensation is confronted with the internal conflict of balancing selfish motives (earning money) against ethical concerns (hurting the passive party). Starting from this basic group setup, we manipulate the underlying workplace scenario across two dimensions (2x2 treatment design). Our workplace variations allow us to study whether employees exploit moral wiggle room to justify selfish behavior (maximizing income). Consequently, our primary focus will lie on employees’ effort (absolute number of encoded letters) under production type “A” across our four workplace settings.
Design details
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