Recruiting and Compensating Civil Servants: A Large-Scale Field Experiment in Zambia (CHWs)

How to cite

Ashraf, Nava; Bandiera, Oriana; Lee, Scott. 2017. "Recruiting and Compensating Civil Servants: A Large-Scale Field Experiment in Zambia (CHWs)." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000064. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.64-1.0

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Nava Ashraf* , Oriana Bandiera , Scott Lee

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0000064
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.64-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2010-09-01 – 2016-07-01
Countries
Zambia (Africa)
JEL codes
J24, 015, M54, D82
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/64

Abstract

State capacity to provide public services depends on the motivation of the agents recruited to deliver them. We design an experiment to quantify the effect of agent selection on service effectiveness. The experiment, embedded in a nationwide recruitment drive for a new government health position in Zambia, shows that agents attracted to a civil service career have more skills and ambition than those attracted to “doing good”. Data from a mobile platform, administrative records, and household surveys show that they deliver more services, change health practices, and produce better health outcomes in the communities they serve.

Intervention

The recruitment and selection process occurred at the community (health post) level, with on-the-ground implementation coordinated by district health officials. In each community, paper advertisements for the job were posted in local public spaces, such as schools, churches, and the health post itself. The treatment poster makes career incentives salient. To do so it lists, as the main benefit, the opportunity to ascend the civil-service career ladder to higher and better-paid positions, which are illustrated and enumerated in the poster--e.g., environmental health technician, nurse, clinical officer, and doctor. This incentive is summarized in a bold caption stating, "Become a community health worker to gain skills and boost your career!" In this setting, the pay gradient associated with career advancement is steep, as the starting monthly wage is USD 290 for CHAs, USD 530 for entry-level nurses, USD 615 for environmental health technicians, and USD 1,625 for resident doctors. The control poster, in contrast, lists as the main benefit the opportunity to contribute to one's community, such as "[gaining] the skills you need to prevent illness and promote health for your family and neighbors" and "[being] a respected leader in your community." This incentive is summarized in a caption stating, "Want to serve your community? Become a community health worker!" Potential applicants exposed to the control poster are thus presented with a description akin to the informal community health workers that are common in these areas, a position they would be familiar with.

Experimental design

The experiment aims to identify the effect of career incentives on performance through selection. We use the recruitment posters described above to experimentally vary the salience of career incentives at the recruitment stage so as to engineer an exogenous change in selection. Once recruited, all CHAs face the same incentives; thus performance differences, if any, are due to selection. Since recruitment for the CHA position was organized by district officials, we randomized treatment at the district level in order to maximize compliance with the experimental assignment, evenly splitting the 48 districts into two groups. This implies that each district official is only exposed to one treatment and is unaware of the other. As district officials are the main source of information for aspiring CHAs, randomization at the district level minimizes the risk of contamination.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer randomization
Randomization unit
District level
Clusters
48 districts
Observations
The government received over 2,400 applications and interviewed 1,585 eligible candidates. Then, 314 candidates attended a year-long training, and 307 graduated and began work as CHAs.
Arms
Treatment: 24 districts Control: 24 districts
Primary outcomes
Pro-social and career preferences, ability, performance, retention, use of health services

Papers from this trial

  1. Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, and Scott Lee. "Do-Gooders and Go-Getters: Career Incentives, Selection, and Performance in Public Service Delivery." Working Paper, February 2015. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/400%20Do-gooders%20Feb2015.pdf

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords