What drives support for inefficient corrective policies? Evidence from an energy ballot initiative
How to cite
Tarduno, Matthew. 2020. "What drives support for inefficient corrective policies? Evidence from an energy ballot initiative." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006399. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6399-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
In this paper I use an information provision experiment conducted about a vote on Nevada’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) to understand how voter beliefs inform support for price versus performance-based policies. By modeling how voter's perception of policy attributes (cost, effectiveness, and equity) map to voting behavior, I will be able to decompose differences in policy support into mutable misperceptions of policy attributes versus differential aversion to certain policies (i.e., a general distaste for tax-based policy). These results have important implications for designing politically feasible corrective policies.
Intervention
[See PAP for details]
Voters will be asked whether they support an RPS ballot initiative, as well as whether they would support a (hypothetical) carbon tax ballot initiative. They will then be asked about: (a) the costs of each policy, (b) the efficacy of each policy, and (c) the distribution impacts of each policy.
Respondents will then be provided with source-randomized, non-deceptive information about these policy attributes. I will use the variation in beliefs about cost, efficacy, and regressivity induced by the information intervention to identify how voter beliefs determine support or opposition for corrective policies.
Experimental design
The experiment will consist of two surveys run on Amazon Mechanical Turk:
1) Elecit Priors: Before the November 2020 election, voters will be asked whether they support an RPS ballot initiative, as well as whether they would support a (hypothetical) carbon tax ballot initiative. They will then be asked to share their beliefs about: (a) the private incidence of each policy, (b) the efficacy of each policy, and (c) the distributional impacts of each policy.
Respondents will then be provided with information on these attributes. The information provision will be source-randomized and non-deceptive. For example, if a respondent receives information on the private incidence of an RPS, this information will be taken from one of two academic papers which come to different conclusions about this policy's costs to consumers.
2) Collect Posteriors: After the election, voters will be asked how they voted on the RPS ballot initiative, as well as whether they would have supported a (hypothetical) carbon tax ballot initiative. They will then be asked to share their posterior beliefs about: (a) the costs of each policy, (b) the efficacy of each policy, and (c) the distribution impacts of each policy.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.