Overcommunication: The role of past experience
How to cite
Ioannidis, Konstantinos. 2020. "Overcommunication: The role of past experience." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006387. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6387-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
A typical finding in experimental cheap talk games is overcommunication. Senders are more truthful and receivers are more credulous that game theory predicts. I test whether overcommunication is observed because people are more familiar with common interest environments where such behavior is optimal. To this end, I use an experiment to establish causality between past experience and behavior in a new environment. Subjects play repeated sender-receiver games with random rematching in two stages of 30 rounds each. My design varies two dimensions, Past and Future. Past varies whether the first stage is with aligned preferences (b=0) or with conflicting (b=2). Future varies whether the environment in the second stage changes permanently (30 rounds with b=1 on stage two) or not (20 rounds with the same bias as first stage and 10 rounds with b=1 in random order on stage two). I compare behavior in the second stage across treatments.
Intervention
My design varies two dimensions, Past and Future. Past varies whether the first stage is with aligned preferences (b=0) or with conflicting (b=2). Future varies whether the environment in the second stage changes permanently (30 rounds with b=1 on stage two) or not (20 rounds with the same bias as first stage and 10 rounds with b=1 in random order on stage two).
Experimental design
Subjects play a standard cheap talk game directly based on Crawford & Sobel (1982). The bias parameter takes three values (b can be either 0, 1 or 2) and is varied both between and within treatments. The experiment consists of two stages. I use two treatments in the first stage. In the Aligned-Mixed treatment, subjects play 30 rounds of a game with aligned preferences (b=0). In the Conflict-Mixed treatment, subjects play 30 rounds of a game with misaligned preferences (b=2). In the second stage of the experiment, all treatments play the same game with partial preference alignment (b=1).
After the main experiment, I elicit a few additional incentivized measures. I elicit risk aversion using the lottery choice task of Eckel & Grossman (2008) and cognitive ability using a modified version of the CRT by Frederick (2005). I also survey some information without incentives: demographics (age, gender, field of study) and attitudes towards trusting strangers using two questions adapted from World Value Survey.
Design details
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