Overcommunication: The role of past experience

How to cite

Ioannidis, Konstantinos. 2020. "Overcommunication: The role of past experience." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006387. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6387-2.0

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Konstantinos Ioannidis*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006387
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6387-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2020-09-30 – 2020-12-31
Countries
Netherlands (Amsterdam)
JEL codes
C72, C91, D82, Z13
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6387

Abstract

A typical finding in experimental cheap talk games is overcommunication. Senders are more truthful and receivers are more credulous that game theory predicts. I test whether overcommunication is observed because people are more familiar with common interest environments where such behavior is optimal. To this end, I use an experiment to establish causality between past experience and behavior in a new environment. Subjects play repeated sender-receiver games with random rematching in two stages of 30 rounds each. My design varies two dimensions, Past and Future. Past varies whether the first stage is with aligned preferences (b=0) or with conflicting (b=2). Future varies whether the environment in the second stage changes permanently (30 rounds with b=1 on stage two) or not (20 rounds with the same bias as first stage and 10 rounds with b=1 in random order on stage two). I compare behavior in the second stage across treatments.

Intervention

My design varies two dimensions, Past and Future. Past varies whether the first stage is with aligned preferences (b=0) or with conflicting (b=2). Future varies whether the environment in the second stage changes permanently (30 rounds with b=1 on stage two) or not (20 rounds with the same bias as first stage and 10 rounds with b=1 in random order on stage two).

Experimental design

Subjects play a standard cheap talk game directly based on Crawford & Sobel (1982). The bias parameter takes three values (b can be either 0, 1 or 2) and is varied both between and within treatments. The experiment consists of two stages. I use two treatments in the first stage. In the Aligned-Mixed treatment, subjects play 30 rounds of a game with aligned preferences (b=0). In the Conflict-Mixed treatment, subjects play 30 rounds of a game with misaligned preferences (b=2). In the second stage of the experiment, all treatments play the same game with partial preference alignment (b=1).

After the main experiment, I elicit a few additional incentivized measures. I elicit risk aversion using the lottery choice task of Eckel & Grossman (2008) and cognitive ability using a modified version of the CRT by Frederick (2005). I also survey some information without incentives: demographics (age, gender, field of study) and attitudes towards trusting strangers using two questions adapted from World Value Survey.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by a computer.
Randomization unit
Matching groups of 8
Clusters
256 participants from 32 matching groups (16 sessions with 16 participants in each split in two matching groups)
Observations
128 observations (since each pair of two participants gives one observation) times 60 rounds = 7,680
Arms
64 participants (8 matching groups) with Past = Aligned-Mixed and Future = Temporary 64 participants (8 matching groups) with Past = Conflict-Mixed and Future = Temporary 64 participants (8 matching groups) with Past = Aligned-Mixed and Future = Temporary 64 participants (8 matching groups) with Past = Conflict-Mixed and Future = Temporary
Primary outcomes
Correlations between states and messages, messages and actions, and actions and states. The leading hypothesis is correlations during the second stage of the experiment between treatments.
Secondary outcomes
Response times

Cited by

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Keywords