Mandatory integration agreements for unemployed job seekers

How to cite

Uhlendorff, Arne; Stephan, Gesine; Berg, Gerard van den. 2020. "Mandatory integration agreements for unemployed job seekers." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006368. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6368-1.0

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Arne Uhlendorff* , Gesine Stephan , Gerard van den Berg

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006368
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6368-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2012-04-01 – 2015-07-15
Countries
Germany ()
JEL codes
J68, J64, C93
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6368

Abstract

In Germany, during their first meeting, the caseworker generally assesses job seekers’ reemployment prospects and considers whether active labor market programs could help them find employment. At the end of the first meeting, job seekers usually sign a mandatory integration agreement with their caseworker, which is a written contract that specifies their rights and obligations in the job search process, such as the activities they are expected to complete. If the job seekers fail to comply with the contract, caseworkers can sanction them by reducing or cutting their unemployment benefits. There exists no causal evidence on the effectiveness of such contracts between caseworkers and unemployed job seekers.

In this project we evaluate the impact of integration agreements on employment outcomes of newly unemployed individuals. Specifically, we randomize two aspects of the policy: the timing of the integration agreement (IA) and the advance notification of the IA. The timing of the IA is randomized as a function of the time since entry into unemployment. One treatment arm involves the IA in the first month, one involves the IA at 3 months, and one at 6 months. In addition, we randomize whether those assigned to receive the IA at 3 months also receive an advance notification of the timing of the future IA at 3 months, upon entry into unemployment. Together this enables us to analyze whether the timing of the IA affects individual labor market outcomes and whether the advance notification of the timing of a future IA has an impact.

We use rich administrative registers to observe outcomes and surveys among job seekers and caseworkers to assess the program.

Intervention

From a sample of job seekers registered as unemployed in five employment agencies, we randomly assigned participants to one of the following groups:

Group 1 (One month): Job seekers signed the contract within the first month after entering unemployment;

Group 2 (Three months, with previous notice): job seekers signed the contract after three months of unemployment and were informed at the beginning of the unemployment spell that they would have to sign a contract after three months. The delay between the notice and the actual signing allowed researchers to test for effects on job seekers’ behavior in anticipation of the integration agreement;

Group 3 (Three months, without previous notice): job seekers signed the contract after three months of unemployment, but they did not receive previous notification;

Group 4 (Six months): job seekers signed a contract after six months of unemployment, without receiving any previous notification.

Experimental design

We set up the experiment in five (of around 180) employment agencies. The participating agencies are geographically dispersed; some are in East and others in West Germany, and we have agencies in rural and urban areas. Moreover, there were no other major ongoing trials and re-organizations in these agencies during our trial period. Another criterium for the selection of agencies was to ensure that we end up with a sufficiently large inflow into unemployment.

80% of the individuals who registered as unemployed between July 2012 and January 2013 in these five employment agencies were randomly selected to participate in our experiment. The participants in the experiment were randomly assigned to one out of four treatment groups during their first meeting with the caseworker.

Our experimental protocol addresses two aspects: the timing of the integration agreement (IA), and whether individuals were informed about a future IA. In treatment group A individuals were supposed to sign their IA during the first month of unemployment. In treatment groups B and C individuals had to sign their IA in the third month of unemployment (if they are still unemployed). Individuals of group B received a written announcement during their first meeting with the caseworker about having to sign an IA in the third month of unemployment. Next to the timing of the IA, this announcement contains a detailed description about the typical content of an IA. It is stated that the IA will specify the type of support the unemployed gets from the public employment service, details about future participation in ALMP programs, and job search requirements. In addition to that, it is stated that non-compliance with the content of an IA might lead to a sanction in form of benefit cuts. In treatment group D, individuals sign a first IA in their sixth month of unemployment (conditionally on still being unemployed).

We designed instruction material and conducted instruction lessons with team leaders of caseworker teams in participating agencies before the project started. The team leaders, in turn, instructed the caseworkers using the material. The instruction material consisted of a presentation, a frequently-asked-questions list and a two-sided plastic slide summarizing the experimental design which was meant to be placed on each caseworker’s desk throughout the experiment. The presentation highlighted the importance of the research question and why it could only be answered by means of a randomized controlled trial. It defined the target group of the experiment, which were new entries into unemployment that were not registered as unemployed during the last quarter prior to their unemployment entry. Only individuals who were eligible for unemployment benefits were supposed to participate in the experiment, excluding individuals younger than 25 and disabled individuals. Furthermore, the material included verbal and graphical descriptions of the different treatment groups. An important part of instructions was that – apart from the different timing of IAs – other elements of the placement process were not supposed to differ across treatment groups, and that in particular all groups should have the same access to instruments of active labor market policy.

Random assignment itself was based on a computer program that was developed by the PES for evaluation purposes. Before or during the meeting with a newly unemployed person, caseworkers had to open the program and to enter the identification number, the name and the date of birth of the unemployed person. After pressing a randomization button, the program immediately showed the corresponding result, which caseworkers then had to document in the usual placement software program. In our analysis, we use the information stored by the randomization program. Beside the time and the result of the randomization, the program also stored the anonymized identifiers of the unemployed and the caseworkers. The caseworkers were not able to manipulate the randomization by for example re-running the randomization tool.

The analysis will be mainly based on administrative data containing information about UI benefit receipt, participation in active labor market policy, meetings with the caseworker, employment spells and wages. In addition to that, we make use of a survey of participants in our experiment one month after entry into UI and of a survey of caseworkers working in the agencies that participate in the RCT, one month before the RCT began. The caseworkers have been interviewed a second time around 5 months after the start of the RCT. We have additionally conducted a second survey of participants around 7 months after entry into UI. It turned out that the response rate for this second wave is rather low. In our analysis, we will mainly focus on men and not women because female labor market histories are more affected by parental leave spells that are not recorded in the administrative data.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization at the individual level, done by a computer program.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
10347 unemployed job seekers participated in the experiment
Observations
10347 unemployed job seekers participated in the experiment
Arms
Group 1 (IA after one month): 2646 Group 2 (IA after three months, with previous notice): 2502 Group 3 (Three months, without previous notice): 2683 Group 4 (Six months): 2516
Primary outcomes
Leaving unemployment for a work
Secondary outcomes
(1) Earnings, (2) Participation in active labor market policy and (3) reservation wages
Partners
Name: Bundesagentur für Arbeit (Federal Employment Agency) Partner_type: government Url: https://www.arbeitsagentur.de

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Keywords