Giving social pressure: Costs, motives, and effects

How to cite

Kim, Woojin. 2020. "Giving social pressure: Costs, motives, and effects." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006364. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6364-1.5

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Woojin Kim*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006364
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6364-1.5
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2020-09-08 – 2020-11-03
Countries
United States of America ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6364

Abstract

While recent studies have found that social pressure can induce people to comply with various norms, little is known about how norms are organically communicated and enforced in everyday life. Anecdotally, when we see someone violate a norm, we are often hesitant to do anything in response. The project measures the incentivized willingness to pay to (not) give social pressure, in the context of college students emailing unregistered peers to register to vote for the 2020 U.S. General Election. Furthermore, it decomposes this cost into Self- (e.g., fear of confrontation) and Other-regarding (e.g., altruism) sources, and examines whether pressuring others increases their chances of registering. These findings are crucial to understand the true welfare costs and effectiveness of policies that aim to use social norms.

Experimental design

In this study, participants send email messages to their unregistered peers pressuring them to register to vote for the upcoming 2020 U.S. General Election. The experiment elicits the incentivized willingness to pay to (not) send these social pressure messages.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is conducted by computer.
Randomization unit
Randomization is at the individual level.
Clusters
1000 participants
Observations
1000 participants
Arms
Historically, around 70% of students on these campuses have registered to vote, which would mean 700 registered and 300 unregistered participants in our sample. 25-33% of the registered participants will be assigned to potentially send the control message (informing about local legislative districts), and the rest will be assigned to potentially send the pressure message. To account for attrition on the part of registered senders, slightly more than half of the unregistered participants will be assigned to receive a pressure message about voter registration from another participant.
Primary outcomes
For participants sending email messages: - Willingness to pay to (not) send the message For participants receiving email messages: - Voter registration rate - Voter turnout rate
Secondary outcomes
For participants sending email messages: - Number of words edited from template message For participants receiving email messages: - Change in predicted current and final registration rate on their campuses

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords