Time and group size inconsistencies in preferences on environmental policy interventions

How to cite

Alt, Marius. 2020. "Time and group size inconsistencies in preferences on environmental policy interventions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006316. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6316-1.0

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Marius Alt*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006316
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6316-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2020-08-10 – 2020-11-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
Q58, D04, C91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6316

Abstract

Given subjects have preferences for environmental well-being, but fail to perform pro-environmental behaviors
due to a lack of self-control, they are assumed to have a positive willingness to pay for commitment devices
to enforce pro-environmental behavior. Therefore, I plan to investigate whether there is a positive demand for environmental
policy interventions as self-commitment devices on an individual level and whether the preference
for a certain environmental policy is dependent on the time of implementation and the amount of people affected
by it. In a laboratory experiment, I use a pro-environmental real effort task as an opportunity for subjects to behave
environmentally friendly. Prior to the task, subjects are asked to rank policy intervention according to their
preferences. The policy interventions vary in their degree of external pressure from lenient, in a social comparison
nudge, to strict, given a punishment scheme. Since I hypothesize that the intervention choice is dependent on
the time of implementation of the pro-environmental task and group size affected by the policy, the treatment
varies across two dimensions. Firstly, the time of implementation is varied as subjects must either perform the
pro-environmental task within the same day or with a delay of one week. Secondly, the regulation either affects
only the person choosing the intervention or it affects also others in the group. It is assumed that subjects with
lower self-control demand stricter policy interventions. In addition, the more the task is postponed into the future
and the greater the number of other people affected by the choice, the higher the likelihood of choosing more
compulsory interventions.

Intervention

The design for the laboratory experiment consists of treatment variations across two dimension. The first dimension
is given by the timing of the implementation of the environmental policy regulation. The second dimension is
structured by the number of regulatees affected by a choice on an environmental policy. I implement a two times two between-subject full factorial design. In addition, the treatment variations contain a within-subject component, as on the regulatee-size dimension participants
who are choose an environmental regulation not only for themselves but also for other participants are
asked to make the same choices in case of being paired with one other person and four other individuals. The order
of these choices is randomized across subjects.

Experimental design

The design for the laboratory experiment consists of treatment variations across two dimension. The first dimension
is given by the timing of the implementation of the environmental policy regulation. The second dimension is
structured by the number of regulatees affected by a choice on an environmental policy. I implement a two times two between-subject full factorial design.In addition, the treatment variations contain a within-subject component, as on the regulatee-size dimension participants
who are choose an environmental regulation not only for themselves but also for other participants are
asked to make the same choices in case of being paired with one other person and four other individuals. The order
of these choices is randomized across subjects.

Design details

Randomization method
Within session randomization of treatment assignment.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
400 individuals
Observations
400 individuals
Arms
400 individuals
Primary outcomes
In the regulatee-size dimension, the matter of investigation lies in the difference of this willingness to accept depending onwhether participants decide only for themselves or whether the regulation will also affect others in the group. In the case of the treatment variations across the time dimension treatment, the effects are slightly weaker. Figure 2 shows the amount of observations per treatment, which would be necessary to detect a significant effect in the time difference of the willingness to accept to change from no regulation to monetary incentive

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Keywords