Cost-effective public good provision under consequential uncertainty

How to cite

Peeters, Ronald; Chan, Nathan; Knowles, Stephen; Wolk, Leonard. 2020. "Cost-effective public good provision under consequential uncertainty." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006304. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6304-1.1

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Ronald Peeters* , Nathan Chan , Stephen Knowles , Leonard Wolk

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006304
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6304-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2020-04-14 – 2023-04-24
Countries
New Zealand ()
JEL codes
C72, C92, D64, H41
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6304

Abstract

When individuals are exposed to multiple public goods at once, that may differ in investment costs and potential benefit, there is the possibility to contribute in a cost-ineffective manner: investments in one public good could better have been invested in another public good. Within this project we study how cost-effectiveness of investment behaviour relates to the nature of the uncertainty underlying the costs and benefits of investments, and which behavioural factors (i.e. individual preferences/attitudes/cognition) are predictive for cost-ineffective giving in which environmental circumstances.

Experimental design

The experiment will be conducted online and participants will be recruited using Prolific. Participants are operating within groups of size three in which they have to solve three tasks (treatments). In each task they have to decide how much to contribute to each of four public goods. In the first task the marginal per capita returns (MPCR) of each of the public goods are known (“certainty”); in the second task the MPCRs are subject to known uncertainty (“risk”); and in the third task the MPCRs are subject to unknown uncertainty (“ambiguity”). Participants will be rewarded according to one of the tasks, but according to all four public goods within this task. The MPCRs are chosen such that cost-effectiveness can be unambiguously determined for all treatments, independent of risk/ambiguity attitude and of individuals’ beliefs about contributions by others. After having solved these tasks, there will be a short questionnaire with some demographic questions (gender and age), an elicitation of their giving-type, their risk and ambiguity attitude, and their attention level and risk literacy. Participants record all their decisions in the computer software (programmed in oTree).

Design details

Randomization method
All randomizations are computerized
Randomization unit
Which task is rewarded and the MPCRs are randomized on group level. Randomizations in the questionnaire (to elicit risk and ambiguity attitude) are on individual level.
Clusters
Different groups will visit the tasks (treatments) in a different order. These orders can be considered clusters. We have six of them.
Observations
We aim for 216 observations (i.e. participants), in order to secure 180 observations. We had 201 participants. During the peer-review process we have been asked to collect more observations, in response to which we collected 107 more observations when aiming for 108.
Arms
We aim for equal distribution of observations across the six clusters.
Primary outcomes
Our primary outcome is whether uncertainty of consequences in public goods affect cost-effectiveness of individual contributions.
Secondary outcomes
How does cost-effectiveness of contributions relate to individual attitudes towards risk and ambiguity, and giving-type?

Materials

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Keywords