Contract framing: Keep your eyes on the prize

How to cite

Essl, Andrea; Jaussi, Stefanie; Bieberstein, Frauke von. 2020. "Contract framing: Keep your eyes on the prize." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006299. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6299-1.1

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Andrea Essl* , Stefanie Jaussi , Frauke von Bieberstein

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006299
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6299-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2020-06-01 – 2021-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6299

Abstract

This online experiment examines the influence of payment modalities on productivity when working under framed incentive contracts. We investigate the effect of payment visualization to make the payment situation more salient to the participants. We employ a 2x2 design with four different treatments varying the incentive contract (bonus vs. penalty) and the visualization (visualized dollar bills vs. description only). Participants work on 15 real effort tasks. At the end, one task is randomly selected for payment. If the selected task is solved correctly, participants in the bonus treatment receive an additional payment. In the penalty treatment, participants receive a higher payment upfront, but can lose part of it, if the selected task is solved incorrectly. Both contracts are payoff-equivalent. We vary whether the payment options are visualized on screen with dollar bills while participants work on the task, or are only explained using a verbal description.

Intervention

Online experiment on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 2x2 between-subject design. Participants are randomized at the individual level. In the Bonus treatments the payment specifies a base pay of 1 USD plus a bonus of 1 USD if the individual solves the selected task correctly. In the Penalty treatments the payment specifies a base pay of 2 USD minus a penalty of 1 USD if the individual solves the selected task incorrectly. In the Visualization treatments images of USD bills are shown on screen. In the Description treatments a verbal explanation without visualization of the possible outcomes is used.

Experimental design

Online experiment on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 2x2 between-subject design. Participants are randomized at the individual level. In the Bonus treatments the payment specifies a base pay of 1 USD plus a bonus of 1 USD if the individual solves the selected task correctly. In the Penalty treatments the payment specifies a base pay of 2 USD minus a penalty of 1 USD if the individual solves the selected task incorrectly. In the Visualization treatments images of USD bills are shown on screen. In the Description treatments a verbal explanation without visualization of the possible outcomes is used.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer (online experiment)
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
In total about 800 participants
Observations
In total about 800 participants
Arms
About 200 participants per treatment
Primary outcomes
Productivity (i.e. number of correct answers) in the real-effort task. We will analyze the data both, for all participants and for those participants, who solve at least one of the 15 tasks correctly.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords