Does Policy Committee Diversity Affect Public Trust and Expectations?

How to cite

D'Acunto, Francesco; Fuster, Andreas; Weber, Michael. 2020. "Does Policy Committee Diversity Affect Public Trust and Expectations?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006274. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6274-1.1

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Francesco D'Acunto* , Andreas Fuster , Michael Weber

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006274
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6274-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2020-08-10 – 2023-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D15, D91, E58, E71, J71, J78, Z1
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6274

Abstract

We use a randomized control trial within an online survey to test causally for a set of non-mutually-exclusive channels through which diversity in policy committees might affect economic outcomes through consumers’ beliefs and choices. Specifically, we study how the salience of the presence of underrepresented demographic groups on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) affects the expectations, beliefs, and choices of different demographics of the US population. We use a set of information treatments regarding recent forecasts of macroeconomic variables by the FOMC, in which we vary the information regarding the identity of FOMC members, by making more or less salient the presence of underrepresented demographic groups in the FOMC. As this salience varies, we test how different demographic groups process the same information about the FOMC’s forecasts, the effects of this information on economic expectations, and the extent to which respondents trust the forecasts and policies the FOMC proposes. We also test whether the salience of demographic representation influences respondents’ choice of reading news about the FOMC versus another policy institution.

Experimental design

The experimental intervention consists of three surveys.

The first survey begins by eliciting respondents’ knowledge and beliefs about the economy. Then, each respondent is randomly allocated to one of 7 groups (with equal probability). The first group is a control group that is not shown any information about Fed forecasts (just some generic Fed-related information). The remaining groups are shown forecasts about either inflation (groups 2-4) or unemployment (groups 5-7) based on official FOMC releases, along with interventions that make more or less salient the extent of minority representation in the FOMC. All respondents are then asked about their trust in the Fed and their economic expectations are elicited again. We also elicit various demographic characteristics.
The main hypotheses we’ll test is whether the same forecast information has differential effects on respondents’ beliefs and trust in the Fed depending on whether minority representation on the FOMC is salient, and in particular whether these effects differ depending on respondents’ own demographic characteristics.

In the second survey, we again elicit respondents’ economic expectations as well as trust in the Fed, to test whether any potential effects found in the main survey persist over time. We will further examine whether the treatment in the main survey affected whether respondents followed Fed news over the intervening month, and whether they appear more informed about the Fed. Finally, we randomize respondents into three groups (orthogonal to treatment groups from the main survey). In group 1, respondents choose whether they want to read a short article based on statements by officials of the Congressional Budget Office or the Federal Reserve. In group 2 and 3, we add the names and titles of the policy makers based on whose statements the news articles are written, only one of which belongs to an underrepresented demographic group. The choices in the three groups allow us to test the extent to which the treatment in the main survey relates to subjects’ willingness to learn about the Fed’s statement relative to other institutions, and the extent to which this choice is mediated by the salience of minority representation in the policy committee.

In the third survey, we will replicate the outcomes and demographic characteristics, motivations, and beliefs indicated in the first survey, but we will assess the effects of the salience of minority representation on the FOMC at the intensive margin (number and composition of multiple FOMC members) rather than the extensive margin (whether the only FOMC member shown to subjects belongs to an underrepresented group. To this aim, subjects will be exposed to one of 8 experimental conditions. The first condition only reports generic information about the Fed, alongside the Fed's logo. The second condition reports the Fed log alongside the March 2023 economic forecasts (inflation and unemployment rate for 2023 and 2024) approved at the March 2023 FOMC meeting. All other experimental conditions report the same forecasts alongside a set of 5 FOMC members' profile pictures and names among those who took part in the March 2023 meeting. Specifically, in condition 3, the group includes 5 white men. In condition 4, three white men and two white women. In condition 5, three white men and two Black men. In condition 6, three white individuals (two men and a woman) and two Black individuals (one man and one woman). In condition 7, four Black individuals (two men and two women) and one white man. In condition 8, the same composition as in 7 but placing the white men, Fed's Chairman Jerome Powell, at the center of the group and emphasizing that he is the Chair.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is performed by a computer that assigns incoming subjects to different experimental arms
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
NA
Observations
8750 in the first survey, of which 3,500 will be contacted for the second survey one month later. 10,000 in the third survey.
Arms
In the first survey, respondents will be randomly exposed to 1 of 7 treatment arms, i.e. the sample size is (approximately) 1,250 per treatment. In the second survey, respondents will be randomly exposed to 1 of 4 treatment arms, i.e. sample size (approximately) 875 per treatment In the third survey, respondents will be randomly exposed to 1 of 8 treatment arms, i.e. the sample size is (approximately) 1,250 per treatment.
Primary outcomes
Main survey: expectations of future inflation and unemployment; trust in the Fed (to adequately manage inflation/unemployment; and to ensure the economic well-being of all Americans); plans for personal spending and labor market behavior. Follow-up survey: expectations of future inflation and unemployment; trust in the Fed (to adequately manage inflation/unemployment; and to ensure the economic well-being of all Americans);; whether read any newspaper articles about Fed over previous month; whether (within survey) choose to read article featuring Fed policy maker (randomized to be either male or female) vs. policy maker from a different organization; how they evaluate article and featured policy maker.

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Keywords