Gender-based conventions across cultures.

How to cite

Sonderegger, Silvia; Pompeo, Monika; Adriani, Fabrizio. 2020. "Gender-based conventions across cultures.." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006272. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6272-1.1

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Silvia Sonderegger* , Monika Pompeo , Fabrizio Adriani

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006272
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6272-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2020-08-15 – 2021-02-28
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C70, C99, J16
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6272

Abstract

Survey participants will be recruited with the use of Dynata, a sampling and data collection company, to conduct an online study. In this study, we plan to examine the effect of different gender labels in a canonical game that is particularly well-suited to study environments with a conflict of interest: the Battle of the Sexes. Two players move simultaneously without the possibility of communication. If both choose option A, player 1 receives 1000 points and player 2 receives 500, while if both choose option B, Player 2 receives 1000 points and player 1 receives 500. If one player chooses option A and the other chooses option B, they both obtain 0 points.
This game entails a conflict of interest because, although each player would ideally like to earn 1000 points, this outcome is not possible for both players. Someone has to give in if the players are to avoid the (0,0) outcome. That is, if they want to earn anything, one of them must accept earning less.

The main objectives are to examine the following:
1) whether participants hold different expectations about the option that will be chosen by the co-player depending on their gender and the co-player ‘s gender
2) whether they make different choices depending on their gender and the co-player’s gender and
3) whether these expectations and choices differ across countries and cultures.

At the beginning of the experiment, all subjects answer a few demographic questions. They are then shown the instruction of the experiment, which consists of a Battle of the Sexes game with no communication. Participants are presented with the options, labelled as Option A and Option B. In the next stage, participants are randomized into six groups.
In the control treatment, subjects receive no information about their co-player’s gender. In the treatment groups, all subjects are told the gender of the opponent, thus creating four subgroups depending on the pair’s gender combinations: MF, MM, FM and FF. Participants are explicitly informed that, after the experiment is over, their choice will be matched with that of a randomly drawn co-player of the specified gender, in order to determine the final payment.
Subjects are required to answer a series of control questions to make sure they understand the incentives of the game. They are given three attempts to correctly reply to the control questions, after which they are excluded from the experiment.
Before making their choice, subjects are asked to guess what the other player is going to choose. This guess is incentivised with a monetary payment. After that, subjects are asked to make their choice between Option A and Option B.
We will test our hypotheses by investigating how choices and expectations differ across genders and whether they depend on the gender of the co-player (in the treatments where this is known). We expect that, in cultures where there is a stronger gender norm of female submission, this will lead to a greater incidence of submissive choices by females and dominant choices by males.

Experimental design

Survey participants are recruited through Dynata, a company which specialises in the recruitment of survey respondents across countries. In the beginning, all subjects answer a few demographic questions. Then are then shown the instruction of the experiment, which consists of a Battle of the Sexes game with no communication. Participants are presented with two choices, labelled as Option A and Option B, which divide the total budget differently between the two players. In order to obtain a positive payment, both players need to choose the same option. Otherwise, they both receive nothing. More precisely, if both players choose option A, player 1 receives 1000 points and player 2 receives 500, while if both choose option B, Player 2 receives 1000 points and player 1 receives 500. If one player chooses option A and the other chooses option B, they both obtain 0 points.

Participants are randomized into six groups. In the control treatment, subjects receive no information about their co-player’s gender. In the treatment groups, all subjects are told the gender of the opponent, thus creating four subgroups depending on the pair’s gender combinations: MF, MM, FM and FF. Participants are explicitly informed that, after the experiment is over, their choice will be matched with that of a randomly drawn co-player of the specified gender, in order to determine the final payment.
Subjects are required to answer a series of control questions to make sure they understand the incentives of the game. They are given three attempts to correctly reply to the control questions, after which they are excluded from the experiment. Before making their choice, subjects are asked to guess what the other player is going to choose. This guess is incentivised with a monetary payment. After that, subjects are asked to make their choice between Option A and Option B.
We will test our hypotheses by investigating how choices and expectations differ across genders and whether they depend on the gender of the co-player (in the treatments where this is known).

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization Method The randomization will be carried out by Dynata, a platform for conducting online experiments.
Randomization unit
The unit of randomization will be the individual subject.
Clusters
N/A
Observations
A minimum of 800 individuals per country with the possibility of having slightly more observations in one of the two countries if necessary.
Arms
200 M/F, 150 MF, 150 MM, 150 FF, 150 FM (X 2 countries)
Primary outcomes
Beliefs about the other player’s choice Allocation choices Primary Outcomes (explanation) Beliefs about the other player’s choice are the answer to the following question. "Which option is Player 2 going to vote for?” The answers are: Option A (500 points for him/herself and 1000 points for me)/ Option B (1000 points for him/herself and 500 points for me) The guess will be incentivised with an additional bonus payment, if the subject guesses correctly. Allocation choices are the answer to the following question. “Which option do you vote for?” The answers are: Option A/Option B The answers of both players are matched ex-post. If their choices coincide, they are paid according to the chosen option.

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Keywords