How markets shape and promote values: a laboratory experiment
How to cite
Zhang, Sili; Weber, Roberto. 2020. "How markets shape and promote values: a laboratory experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006244. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6244-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We study whether market exchange can promote and transmit the values held by market participants. Specifically, we investigate the conjecture that consumers prefer to exchange with sellers whose behavior reflects consumers’ values and that this, in turn, leads to public support for those values by counterparts seeking improved market outcomes. We document in a laboratory experiment that consumers prefer exchanging with counterparts who express support for their values, even when the exchange has no impact on the actual promotion of those values. Specifically, we find that consumers’ willingness-to-pay is increasing in sellers’ donations to organizations supported by consumers, even though the donations have already been made and cannot be influenced by consumers' purchasing decisions. In turn, sellers anticipate such concern and donate more in support of consumers’ values, but only when there are potential mutual benefits from market exchange.
Intervention
The following three treatment interventions are implemented between subjects:
- Matched treatment: each seller will donate to the organization selected by the consumer with whom he or she is matched in each period; each consumer can condition their willingness-to-pay choices on the amount of donation made by the seller.
- Random treatment: each seller will donate to the organization selected by a different consumer than the one with whom he or she is matched; each consumer can condition their willingness-to-pay choices on the amount of donation made by the seller.
- Control treatment: each seller will donate to the organization selected by the consumer with whom he or she is matched in each period; each consumer cannot condition their willingness-to-pay choices on the amount of donation made by the seller.
We also vary, within-subjects, across rounds the following two treatment interventions:
- Market: there are potential gains from exchange in the market.
- No Market: the procedures are identical but there are no potential gains from exchange.
Experimental design
We set up an experimental induced-value market with buyers and sellers in the laboratory using 2 x 3 design. The value preference is implemented in the experiment as a preference for a variety of organizations that support different causes. In our first main betwee-subjects treatment arm (Matched), sellers can make an unconditional donation to the organization selected by the buyer with whom they are matched in each trading period. After the donation choice, we vary whether the interaction occurs in a Market context (where there exists a surplus to be realized from exchange) or in a Non-market context (where there is no surplus). Consumers' willingness-to-pay is elicited via an incentive-compatible BDM mechanism before the price offer is revealed.
We also implement two other between-subjects treatment arms. In Random condition, the organizations to which sellers can make donations are determined randomly from choices made by buyers in previous sessions. We also have a Control condition in which buyers cannot condition their purchasing decisions on the donation made by sellers.
Design details
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