How does the Organization of Crowdsourcing Affect Labor Supply, Productivity and Morals

How to cite

Hornuf, Lars; Klein, Kristina. 2021. "How does the Organization of Crowdsourcing Affect Labor Supply, Productivity and Morals." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006242. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6242-1.0

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Lars Hornuf* , Kristina Klein

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006242
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6242-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2021-06-28 – 2022-01-01
Countries
Germany (Bremen)
JEL codes
J22, J24, D91
Secondary IDs
DFG HO 5296/3-1
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6242

Abstract

The organization of crowdsourcing comes in various forms. The most common organizational forms are crowd labor markets, crowd collaborative communities, and crowd contests. In this paper, we experimentally study labor supply, productivity, and morals under these three organizational forms of crowdsourcing.

Intervention

There are two interventions:

(1) Organizational form of crowdsourcing

(a) crowd labor market
(b) crowd collaborative community
(c) crowd contest

(2) Degree of overpay

(a) low
(b) high

Experimental design

We have designed a randomized control trial, in which participants will be randomly assigned to different treatment groups (crowd labor markets, crowd collaborative communities, and crowd contests) and extents of overpay. We use two controlled manipulations: organizational form of crowdsourcing and extent of overpay. The experiment is followed by a questionnaire in order to conduct balancing checks.

Design details

Randomization method
We will randomly allocate sessions (and thus participants) with 1/3 probability to the crowd labor market, crowd collaborative community, and crowd contest treatment. If only one participant signs up for an experimental session, the session must be a crowd labor market session. Treatment status is assigned on the group level.
Randomization unit
The unit of randomization is the experimental sessions.
Clusters
210 individual participants from the BreLAB pool
Observations
210 individual participants from the BreLAB pool
Arms
70 crowd labor markets treatment, 70 crowd contest treatment, 70 crowd collaborative community treatment
Primary outcomes
Labor supply Labor productivity Reaction to overpay
Secondary outcomes
We investigate the following second-order effects: the extent of overpay (low = EUR 1.00, high = EUR 5.00) and how it affects participants reaction to overpay.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords