Estimating Belief-based Utility

How to cite

Kozakiewicz, Marta. 2020. "Estimating Belief-based Utility." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006233. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6233-1.0

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Marta Kozakiewicz*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006233
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6233-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2020-07-28 – 2020-08-28
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D91, D83, C91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6233

Abstract

We collect data from a laboratory experiment to investigate the belief-based component of the utility function. The experiment consists of two parts: an IQ test and a learning exercise. In the main treatment, every participant observes a signal about his relative performance in the IQ test. The signal is either perfectly informative or entirely uninformative with equal probability. Then the participant is asked to report his subjective probability of the signal being indicative of his performance. In the control treatment, participants do not observe signals but are asked to submit reports for each possible signal realization. We assume that a signal about cognitive ability received in the main treatment affects subjects' belief-based utility, while a signal that is being considered in the control treatment does not. This allows us to empirically investigate the belief-based component of the utility function and estimate its parameters at the population level, as well as for groups of individuals with similar characteristics. Moreover, we plan to use the data from the main treatment to reconcile contradictory evidence on asymmetric updating (Eil and Rao, 2011; Mobius et al, 2014; Schwardmann and van der Weele, 2016; Buser et al., 2018; Coutts, 2018) and further investigate the role of expectations in beliefs formation. In particular, we plan to examine beliefs updating about events to which subjects assign zero prior probability. Last but not least, we use additional survey data to examine the occurrence of time inconsistency in belief formation arising due to anticipatory feelings over upcoming signal realizations. Therefore, we plan to test the psychological expected utility theory formulated by Caplin and Leahy (2001).

Experimental design

Participants are randomly assigned to one of two treatments. In the main treatment, every participant observes a signal about his relative performance in the IQ test. The signal is either perfectly informative or entirely uninformative with equal probability. Then the participant is asked to report his subjective probability of the signal being his performance. In the control treatment, participants do not observe signals but are asked to submit reports for each possible signal realization.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
randomization at the level of experimental session (every session is randomly assigned to be either the treatment or the control); randomization at the individual level in the main treatment (a participant obtains a signal that is equal to his relative performance with probability 0.5 or, with the same probability, equal to a randomly drawn number)
Clusters
2 treatments
Observations
396
Arms
294 in the main treatment, 102 in the control treatment
Primary outcomes
There are two main outcome variables: 1. the subjective beliefs about one's IQ test result measured before observing a signal, and 2. the subjective probability of the signal being indicative of one's relative performance (measured in the main treatment after observing the signal, and after considering the signal in the control treatment).
Secondary outcomes
Additionally, we collect data on subjects' personality traits, anxiety (state and trait), test-related emotions experienced during the task and habitual use of emotion regulation strategies.

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Keywords