Ignoring Good Advice
How to cite
Sgroi, Daniel; Ronayne, David. 2020. "Ignoring Good Advice." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006229. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6229-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Advice should (rationally) be followed by an advisee if accepting it leads to a higher expected payoff than ignoring it. Whether, when and why people deviate from this are important social science questions. We wish to explore the behavioral factors (i.e., those outside the standard rational economic paradigm) that may lie behind such deviations from rationality.
Intervention
In the main wave of the study (wave 2), subjects will undertake two (incentivized) tasks; a random (coin-flipping) task and a real-effort (number-counting) task, which provide within-subject variation. Subjects will then be offered the chance to take advice from an adviser (another subject drawn from wave 1 of the study which we will run in advance of wave 2). We vary the remuneration of the adviser, which provides randomized between-subject variation.
Experimental design
WAVE 1: In wave 1, subjects will be recruited using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). We will ask them to complete 2 tasks. In one they guess the result of 5 coin tosses. In the second they count the number of 1s in 5 matrices of 0s and 1s. Both tasks will be incentivized. We will reveal their performance in the 2 tasks and ask if they are willing to advise later subjects (advisees; those in wave 2 of the experiment) to submit their answers instead of those chosen by the wave 2 subject. We will select some of the consenting wave 1 subjects as advisers for wave 2. Each selected wave 1 subject will be randomized into a different treatment in which they are paid differently. In one treatment the adviser will receive a payment at the same level as the subjects in wave 2. In a second treatment they will receive a larger payment. A third treatment involves a payment that is only awarded if wave 2 subjects follow their advice, which allows wave 2 subjects to directly influence the remuneration of the adviser. Note that in each case wave 1 subjects will receive the same bonus (incentive) payment instructions as seen by wave 2 subjects, which specify the minimum bonus they will receive: earning a larger bonus (for instance in the second treatment) will not influence the adviser's behavior since this will only become apparent after they have completed the task.
WAVE 2: In wave 2, subjects (different MTurk subjects) will take the same 2 tasks as in wave 1 (which will provide within-subject variation). This time, after taking the tasks, they will be offered the chance to follow the advice of one of the wave 1 advisers (the between-subject treatment). When making this choice, they will also be told: (1) their own performance; (2) an adviser's performance and (3) how the adviser was remunerated. Note that in wave 2 it will be made clear to subjects that the adviser received the same instructions as they did regarding payment, and hence the adviser did not know the size of the bonus before completing the tasks and so this would not have influenced the adviser's behavior more than it did their own. The different levels of adviser remuneration provide between-subject randomized variation since each wave 2 subject is randomly allocated to one of the three wave 1 remuneration treatments for advisers. All wave 2 subjects will then complete a Raven's progressive matrix test, the Dispositional Envy Scale (Smith, Parrott, Diener, Hoyle & Kim, 1999), a test of general stubbornness (Wilkins, 2015), the SCE-8 scale (Ronayne, Sgroi & Tuckwell, 2020) and some general demographic questions as well as two questions on advice-taking in the COVID19 pandemic.
Design details
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