Can Transparency in Effluent Environmental Monitoring Reduce Pollution?

How to cite

Carozzi, Felipe; Caffera, Marcelo. 2020. "Can Transparency in Effluent Environmental Monitoring Reduce Pollution?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006226. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6226-1.0

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Felipe Carozzi* , Marcelo Caffera

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006226
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6226-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2020-09-01 – 2022-06-15
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6226

Abstract

We want to study how transparency and access to information regarding firms' polluting activities shapes subsequent polluting behaviour by these firms in Montevideo, Uruguay. Specifically, we want to test whether transparency regarding compliance with environmental regulations in waste product processing can improve the ecological footprint of these firms. In association with the effluent inspectors unit of the Montevideo municipal government, we create Ykarai, an observatory of firm compliance which uses an easily interpretable coulour-coded system to report the track record of manufacturing firms in terms of liquid pollutants. Using this observatory, we progressively disseminate data on firms' behaviour for up to 129 firms. We introduce firms in three randomly selected batches in four month periods until all firms are included. We use this staggered inclusion process to study how firms react to publication of information on compliance. Our outcomes include reported pollution, measured pollution and communications with the monitoring body.

Intervention

We create an online observatory to release information on compliance with industrial effluent regulation for manufacturers operating in Montevideo, Uruguay.

Experimental design

We randomly assign monitoring firms to different groups and then proceed to launch the Observatory with staggered information releases based on those groups. This induces experimental variation in the availabilty of contemporaneous information on compliance at the firm level. Randomization is based on stratified random sampling, with strata related to firm characteristics (historical record of compliance, frequency of inspections and broadly-defined sector).

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer (Stata). Stratified by urn, the level of infringements before treatment and sector (food producer or not).
Randomization unit
Firms.
Clusters
128
Observations
128
Arms
45, 49, 34
Primary outcomes
We have three main outcomes. Reported pollution levels, measured pollution levels, and the frequency of interactions with the regulator (communications, complaints, etc.). The first variables correspond to pollutant concentration levels as reported by the firm in each period. There is one time series of reported levels for each pollutant. We will also use measured pollution levels as recorded by the municipal inspectors each month (i.e. the variables underlying the colour coded classification of compliance discussed above). We will also know the frequency of formal contacts between the regulator (Unidad de efluentes) and the firms.

Cited by

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Keywords