Costly information acquisition and uninformed voting
How to cite
Bayer, Ralph-C; Pimientas, Carlos; Faravelli, Marco. 2020. "Costly information acquisition and uninformed voting." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006224. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6224-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
This project investigates if election and referendum outcomes are distorted due to some voters casting their vote despite being uninformed. A game-theoretic model with rational agents shows that the voters in a society who have the lowest cost of getting informed about candidates or alternatives in an election or referendum should acquire the information and vote. Citizens who have higher information acquisition cost should not get informed and abstain from voting (if voting is not compulsory). Anecdotal evidence suggests that many people vote without being properly informed (e.g. spike in google searches for “what is Brexit?” after the referendum in the UK). Uninformed voting reduces the likelihood that the actually preferred alternative in a referendum or their preferred candidate/party in a general election is chosen. Hence, uninformed voting is a threat to the efficiency of the democratic process.This study uses the Amazon Turk platform to investigate if the phenomenon of uninformed voting is sizable. Treatment variations are designed in order to identify the mechanisms causing the phenomenon and to evaluate their relative importance.
Intervention
We will use the computer-work platform Amazon Mechanical Turk to implement a voting game with costly information acquisition. Participants are grouped with other participants in an electorate and receive 2 US Dollars for reading the instructions and answering a few control questions. The electorate's task is to choose one out of two alternatives via majority voting. If the collective chooses the "correct" alternative then everybody receives 5 US Dollars. If the wrong alternative is chosen, then no payout occurs. Ex-ante both alternatives are equally likely to be correct. Participants are then asked if they would like to buy information. Buying information allows participants to update their beliefs such that they know which alternative is twice as likely to be correct than the other. Subjects know their own cost, which is drawn from a uniform distribution but only know the distribution the cost of for the others in the electorate are drawn from. After acquiring information (or not), participants are asked to either vote for one of the two alternatives or to abstain. Votes are tallied and payouts are realized. Note that in equilibirum nobody should ever vote without acquiring information.
We will vary this basic game in two dimensions: a) size of the electorate, b) framing of the situation and information provided. The size dimension allows us to investigate if the likelihood of being pivotal impacts the prevalence of uninformed voting. Varying the framing and the specific information provided allows us to differentiate between different psychological mechanisms that could lead to uninformed voting.
A secondary question is how size and framing impact the voting informed versus abstaining decision.
Over-all we are planning on a 24 treatments.
Experimental design
Our experimental design varies two dimensions:
a) the specific presentation of the task
b) the size of the electorate
By varying the presentations and specifics of the task we will be able to distinguish between different mechanisms that contribute to uninformed voting such as, bounded rationality, expressive voting and biased beliefs. By varying the size of the electorate we will be able to investigate how the likelihood to be pivotal influences the prevalence of uninformed voting. Interaction effects between mechanisms and the likelihood to be pivotal will also be identifiable.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.