Preferences for Redistribution: The Roles of Relative Income and Social Mobility
How to cite
Rostam-Afschar, Davud; Vietz, Jasmin. 2020. "Preferences for Redistribution: The Roles of Relative Income and Social Mobility." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006155. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6155-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Understanding how citizens form their preferences for redistribution is crucial for policy makers in order to implement appropriate measures to counteract inequality. As inequality in the United States has been growing in the past decades and in particular in the light of the current COVID-19 crisis, this is a highly relevant question. We investigate two determinants of preferences for redistribution: relative income and perception of social mobility. We do this by using an online survey experiment within a representative sample of US citizens. We experimentally change i) the participant’s relative income, i.e. her position in the income distribution, and ii) her perception about the degree of social mobility. Our novel methodology allows us to not only identify the willingness of a taxpayer to redistribute own income between herself and others (selfish motive), but also her preferences over how income is allocated among all persons in the income distribution (fairness motive).
Intervention
We conduct an online survey experiment in which we vary participants relative income position. In addition, we inform people about social mobility in their state of residence.
Experimental design
The online survey experiment consists of two parts: In the first part, participants face three redistribution decisions that only differ in the participant’s own relative position in the income distribution. In the second part of the experiment, we provide half of the participants with information on the degree of social mobility in the state the participant lives in. Under this new set of information, participants re-take the redistribution decisions from part one. This experimental design allows us to study the within as well as the between participant variation in preferences for redistribution.
Design details
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