Lock-in Effects in Online Labor Markets

How to cite

Stenzhorn, Eliza; Hornuf, Lars; Ciotti, Fabrizio. 2021. "Lock-in Effects in Online Labor Markets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006136. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6136-1.4

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Eliza Stenzhorn* , Lars Hornuf , Fabrizio Ciotti

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006136
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6136-1.4
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2021-02-08 – 2023-05-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
J22, J24, D91
Secondary IDs
DFG HO 5296/3-1
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6136

Abstract

Lock-in effects arise when individuals are dependent on a particular product or service and cannot switch to another product or service without incurring significant switching costs. In this paper, we theoretically and experimentally study switching behavior of digital workers, which results from the exploitation of locked-in digital workers by the respective labor market platform. We investigate the extent and frequency of the exploitation as second-order effects. Lock-in effects frequently result from the absence of reputation portability, thereby generating high switching costs for platform users. We therefore analyze whether reputation portability increases switching behavior in an online labor market context. Our experimental design explains switching based on (1) monetary motives and (2) other-regarding behavior, i.e., we examine whether digital workers base their decisions on the economic outcome of their earnings, or whether they react to what they believe to be the intentions of the platform.

Intervention

There are three interventions:
(1) the strength of lock-in (reputation portability vs. no reputation portability)
(2) the exploitation of lock-in (platform fee vs. no platform fee)
(3) the equality of exploitation of lock-in (platforms that simultaneously charge identical fees vs. only the focal platform charges a fee).

Experimental design

We have designed a randomized control trial, where all subjects will be randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. The study relies on a 2 × 2 × 2 design. We use a combination of controlled manipulations in a field setting and observe switching behavior of workers in online labor markets. The experiment is followed by a questionnaire to identify mediating factors, to control for confounding variables and individual heterogeneity.

Design details

Randomization method
A designated function by the software package Unipark will randomly assign participants to the treatments. Before we start with our analysis, we will check whether randomization by Unipark resulted in a balanced sample. In case socio-economic and other factors of the subjects are not balanced between control and treatment conditions, we will apply appropriate matching techniques.
Randomization unit
Randomization will be done on an individual level.
Clusters
Since the experiment is not clustered, the number of clusters is the same as the sample size (see below).
Observations
2,112 individual workers from the crowdsourcing platform Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Arms
- 132 individuals in the no portability, no platform fee, and identical platforms treatment conditions - 132 individuals in the no portability, no platform fee, and differentiating platforms treatment conditions - 396 individuals in the no portability, platform fee, and identical platforms treatment conditions - 396 individuals in the no portability, platform fee, and differentiating platforms treatment conditions - 132 individuals in the portability, no platform fee, and identical platforms treatment conditions - 132 individuals in the portability, no platform fee, and differentiating platforms treatment conditions - 396 individuals in the portability, platform fee, and identical platforms treatment conditions - 396 individuals in the portability, platform fee, and differentiating platforms treatment conditions
Primary outcomes
We distinguish switching based on monetary motives and other-regarding behavior. Our first outcome of interest is whether a worker, due to monetary motives, switches platforms if the focal platform charges a fee. Our second outcome of interest is whether a worker, due to other-regarding behavior, switches platforms if the focal platform charges a fee. Our third outcome of interest is whether reputation portability increases workers’ switching behavior.
Secondary outcomes
We investigate the following second-order effects: the extent of lock-in exploitation (fee of USD 0.00, USD 0.01, USD 0.05) and the frequency of lock-in exploitation (no, one, two fee increases), risk attitude, and the experience as a worker in crowdsourcing markets.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords