Sustainability as a Dynamic Game

How to cite

Dubois, Corinne; Fürer, Stephanie; Maillard-Bjedov, Tjasa; Buechel, Berno. 2022. "Sustainability as a Dynamic Game." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006132. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6132-1.4

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Corinne Dubois* , Stephanie Fürer , Tjasa Maillard-Bjedov , Berno Buechel

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006132
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6132-1.4
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2022-01-19 – 2022-06-30
Countries
Switzerland ()
JEL codes
C73, C91, C92, H41, Q56
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6132

Abstract

Sustainability is a crucial concept in the environmental domain, but also in other areas such as financial matters or regarding personal health. Sustainability means using resources in a way that does not compromise the availability of those resources tomorrow. We propose a dynamic threshold public goods game that captures essential features of sustainability. First, the game is dynamic in the sense that the actions played in each period have consequences for future periods. Second, over-using given resources (i.e. above a certain threshold) leads to a decline of these resources. Finally, in many applications, such as the climate and environment preservation, cooperation between many individuals is required to reach a sustainable path, while the temptation to over-use resources is strong. Our game reflects this with its public goods character when there is more than one decision maker. We derive equilibrium behavior and test the predictions in a lab experiment. Our experimental design includes a single versus multi-player game treatment to assess the role of strategic interactions and a high versus low threshold treatment. We want to investigate whether sustainability is achieved more often when it is an equilibrium strategy, and how different personality traits moderate the chosen strategies.

Intervention

We study the sustainability game on the online platform Prolific.

Our experimental design includes three treatments.
T-Baseline: 4-player groups with high threshold
Treatment T-OnePlayer: 1-player "groups" with high threshold
Treatment T-LowThreshold: 4-player groups with low threshold

The baseline treatment represents a pure social dilemma: it is socially optimal for the group to contribute the threshold amount but it is individually rational for each player to defect, i.e. contributing zero. Treatment T-OnePlayer eliminates strategic interactions between players and has a unique equilibrium that coincides with the social optimum.Treatment T-LowThreshold lowers the threshold that must be met to achieve sustainability and has both defection and cooperation (i.e. contributing according to the threshold) as equilibria.

Experimental design

The experiment will be run online and include 270 participants randomly assigned to the three treatment groups: T-Baseline, T-OnePlayer, and T-LowThreshold. The experiment lasts about one hour and includes 4 parts:

Part 1: Sustainability game.
Participants read the instruction for the sustainability game and respond to comprehension questionnaire. The computer then forms groups of 4 players (in T-Baseline and T-T-LowThreshold) or 1 player (in T-OnePlayer).
The sustainability game is a dynamic game played over a random number of periods. In each period, players are given a certain number of points as an endowment and must decide how to split these points between a private and a special account. The private account represents individual gains while the special account, which is common for all members of a group, determines future endowments. At the end of the period, players are informed about the contributions of the other members in their group (in T-Baseline and T-LowThreshold), the total contribution of their group, whether the threshold was met or not and their endowment for the next period. In relative terms the stage game is the same in every period.
The whole game is repeated 6 times.

Part 2: Elicitation of risk aversion
Players receive 100 points and must decide how many to invest in a profitable but risky project. We measure risk aversion with the amount invested by each player.

Part 3 Measuring cognitive abilities
We measure cognitive abilities using 12 questions out of the Set 2 of the Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices.

Part 4: Personality, ecological and demographic questionnaires
Personality test: The test uses 24 items from the International Personality Item Pool to measure two aspects of participants’ personality (Agreeableness and Conscientiousness).
New ecological paradigm: 15 items to measure pro-environmental orientation, following Dunlap et al (2000)
CO2 footprint questionnaire: 6 questions based on the WWF Swiss footprint calculator, based on Berger and Wyss (2021)
Demographic questionnaire

Design details

Randomization method
Treatments are randomly assigned to separate sessions. Randomization within the game (number of periods) is done by the computer.
Randomization unit
Treatment assignment is randomized on the experimental sessions. Number of periods that a game lasts is randomized at group level.
Clusters
30 groups per treatment, i.e. 90 groups in total. Group size is four for T-Baseline and T-LowThreshold and one for T-OnePlayer. Number of participans should therefore be 270.
Observations
270 participants
Arms
30 groups per treatment.
Primary outcomes
Individual Level: Contribution share, equilibrium play (cooperation or defection) Group Level: Endowment, threshold met, contribution share
Secondary outcomes
Individual Level: Gains Group Level: Sustainability, waste, standard deviation of contributions
Sponsors
Name: University of Fribourg - research pool Location: Fribourg, Switzerland Url: https://www.unifr.ch

Papers from this trial

  1. Buechel, Berno and Dubois, Corinne and Fuerer, Stephanie and Bjedov, Tjasa, Sustainability as a Dynamic Game. University of Fribourg. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4225008 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4225008 current version always here: www.berno.info

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Keywords