Motivating Bureaucrats: Autonomy vs Performance Pay for Public Procurement in Pakistan
How to cite
Best, Michael; Bandiera, Oriana; Khan, Adnan; Prat, Andrea. 2015. "Motivating Bureaucrats: Autonomy vs Performance Pay for Public Procurement in Pakistan." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000610. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.610-7.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
This project works directly with the government of Punjab, Pakistan to improve the effectiveness of public procurement. We develop two novel methods to measure procurement effectiveness and leakages based on detailed, item-level characteristics data and random field audits of purchases. We then implement a field experiment to study how these are affected by two policy reforms targeting bureaucrats’ extrinsic and intrinsic motivations to achieve value for money in procurement. The first treatment awards financial bonuses for good procurement performance. The second treatment empowers bureaucrats to exercise discretion in procurement to achieve better value for money by giving them a larger cash-in-hand budget, making pre-audit procedures simpler and more predictable, and releasing their procurement budget earlier. A third treatment combines the two to identify complementarities.
Experimental design
Drawing and Disbursing Officers (the government officers legally responsible for public procurement) are randomly allocated to 1 of 5 treatments, stratifying by district and by line department (Health, Higher Education, Communication & Works, Agriculture). Treatment arm 1: Financial bonuses for good procurement performance; data collected through POPS. Treatment arm 2: Increased discretion for bureaucrats; data collected through POPS. Treatment arm 3: Combined treatments 1 & 2. Treatment arm 4: Control group; data collected through POPS. Treatment arm 5: Pure control group; data not collected through POPS, but through field visits.
Design details
Materials
Papers from this trial
- Bandiera, Oriana, Michael Carlos Best, Adnan Qadir Khan and Andrea Prat, The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats, Working Paper: Columbia University https://blogs.cuit.columbia.edu/mcb2270/files/2021/01/BBKP_AuthorityOrganizations_Jan21.pdf
- Bandiera, Oriana, Michael Carlos Best, Adnan Qadir Khan and Andrea Prat, "The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 136, Issue 4, November 2021, Pages 2195–2242 https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjab029
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.