Motivating Bureaucrats: Autonomy vs Performance Pay for Public Procurement in Pakistan

How to cite

Best, Michael; Bandiera, Oriana; Khan, Adnan; Prat, Andrea. 2015. "Motivating Bureaucrats: Autonomy vs Performance Pay for Public Procurement in Pakistan." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000610. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.610-7.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Michael Best* , Oriana Bandiera , Adnan Khan , Andrea Prat

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0000610
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.610-7.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2014-07-01 – 2017-04-30
Countries
Pakistan (Punjab)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/610

Abstract

This project works directly with the government of Punjab, Pakistan to improve the effectiveness of public procurement. We develop two novel methods to measure procurement effectiveness and leakages based on detailed, item-level characteristics data and random field audits of purchases. We then implement a field experiment to study how these are affected by two policy reforms targeting bureaucrats’ extrinsic and intrinsic motivations to achieve value for money in procurement. The first treatment awards financial bonuses for good procurement performance. The second treatment empowers bureaucrats to exercise discretion in procurement to achieve better value for money by giving them a larger cash-in-hand budget, making pre-audit procedures simpler and more predictable, and releasing their procurement budget earlier. A third treatment combines the two to identify complementarities.

Experimental design

Drawing and Disbursing Officers (the government officers legally responsible for public procurement) are randomly allocated to 1 of 5 treatments, stratifying by district and by line department (Health, Higher Education, Communication & Works, Agriculture). Treatment arm 1: Financial bonuses for good procurement performance; data collected through POPS. Treatment arm 2: Increased discretion for bureaucrats; data collected through POPS. Treatment arm 3: Combined treatments 1 & 2. Treatment arm 4: Control group; data collected through POPS. Treatment arm 5: Pure control group; data not collected through POPS, but through field visits.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer program
Randomization unit
Drawing and Disbursing Officer (the bureaucrat with the legal responsibility and authority for conducting public procurement)
Clusters
1074 Drawing and Disbursing Officers (DDOs)
Observations
Approx 1074*50=53,700
Arms
202 in Incentive payment arm 203 in Discretion arm 228 in Combined treatments arm 320 in Control group 121 in Pure Control group
Primary outcomes
Our main outcome variables are twofold. 1-Quality-adjusted prices paid 2-Quality, quantity and price discrepancies between products procured as self-reported and as revealed through audit.

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Bandiera, Oriana, Michael Carlos Best, Adnan Qadir Khan and Andrea Prat, The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats, Working Paper: Columbia University https://blogs.cuit.columbia.edu/mcb2270/files/2021/01/BBKP_AuthorityOrganizations_Jan21.pdf
  2. Bandiera, Oriana, Michael Carlos Best, Adnan Qadir Khan and Andrea Prat, "The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 136, Issue 4, November 2021, Pages 2195–2242 https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjab029

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords