Gender Differences In Reaction To Enforcement Mechanisms

How to cite

Bao, Zhengyang; Huang, Difang. 2020. "Gender Differences In Reaction To Enforcement Mechanisms." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006095. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6095-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Zhengyang Bao* , Difang Huang

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0006095
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6095-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2017-01-01 – 2017-04-01
Countries
China (All over the nation)
JEL codes
C93, D91, J16
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/6095

Abstract

We follow borrowers from a peer-to-peer lending platform to study how females and males react to enforcement mechanisms differently. In the experiment, borrowers are randomized into treatments where they receive different text messages urging for timely repayment if they have loans due the “next day”.

Intervention

Male and female borrowers with no overdue history are randomized into one of the treatments and receive text messages from the platform asking them to make the repayment on time. The content of the message varies across treatments. To encourage the repayment, we embed into the messages one of three types of enforcement mechanisms that are widely explored in the literature. The first mechanism is a simple reminder message to mitigate the delays caused by limited attention. The second mechanism invokes social pressure. In particular, we test how borrowers react to information about the social norm (i.e., most borrowers repaid on time) and a threat to inform the endorser (usually a person close to the borrower) if the borrower fails to repay on time. The third mechanism introduces financial incentives. We test rewards for compliance (i.e., the platform offered to decrease the interest rate for future borrowing if the borrower made the repayment on time) and punishments for non-compliance (i.e., the platform threatened to increase the interest rate if the borrower failed to make the repayment on time).

Experimental design

Male and female borrowers with no overdue history are randomized into one of the treatments and receive text messages from the platform asking them to make the repayment on time. The content of the message varies across treatments. To encourage the repayment, we embed into the messages one of three types of enforcement mechanisms that are widely explored in the literature. The first mechanism is a simple reminder message to mitigate the delays caused by limited attention. The second mechanism invokes social pressure. In particular, we test how borrowers react to information about the social norm (i.e., most borrowers repaid on time) and a threat to inform the endorser (usually a person close to the borrower) if the borrower fails to repay on time. The third mechanism introduces financial incentives. We test rewards for compliance (i.e., the platform offered to decrease the interest rate for future borrowing if the borrower made the repayment on time) and punishments for non-compliance (i.e., the platform threatened to increase the interest rate if the borrower failed to make the repayment on time).

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done by a computer.
Randomization unit
There is no cluster. We randomize each individual into a treatment.
Clusters
We do not have clusters. In total we plan to have 18000 borrowers (individuals).
Observations
18000 borrowers (individuals).
Arms
3600 in control, 2880 in each of Reminder, Norm, Shame, Punishment, and Reaward treatments. We oversample the baseline by 25% to increase the statistical power of each pairwise comparison.
Primary outcomes
Overdue rate.
Secondary outcomes
Days overdue, default ratio.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords