Moral Hazard, Networks and Risk Sharing: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field

How to cite

Jain, Prachi. 2015. "Moral Hazard, Networks and Risk Sharing: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000605. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.605-2.0

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Prachi Jain*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0000605
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.605-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2015-01-28 – 2015-08-15
Countries
Kenya (Nairobi)
JEL codes
O10, O12, O17, D86, E21
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/605

Abstract

Risk sharing, in which individuals and households make both monetary and non-monetary transfers to each other, is an important mechanism through which households can cope with idiosyncratic risk in settings with little or no access to insurance. Moral hazard, in which individuals cannot observe the actions of others, may exist in these settings and limit the potential for risk sharing. The purpose of my research project is to investigate the extent to which moral hazard limits risk sharing and whether social proximity can help overcome the problems of the moral hazard. I use a laboratory experiment in Nairobi, Kenya with residents of the Kibera slum to address these questions.

Intervention

We have participants will play three risk sharing games with partners. We vary how income is generated (luck only, luck and effort) and, in the games with effort, whether effort is observable to partners.

Experimental design

Participants will play three risk sharing games with partners. Individuals will play a luck only game, a game with luck and observable completion of a task and a game with luck and unobservable completion of a task. Subjects will play all three games and game order will be randomized. Participants are randomly assigned to play each game with a partner. Partnerships are non-anonymous - meaning that participants will know their partner's name and may know their partner outside of the laboratory.

Design details

Randomization method
Game order is randomized (by a computer in advance of the session). Due to the fact that the number of participants per session varies and thus the number of experiment sessions cannot be known in advance, I use "block" randomization. There are 6 possible game orders of the 3 risk sharing games. I ensure that in every block of 6 sessions, each possible game order is used exactly once. I randomize order separately for each block of 6 sessions.
Randomization unit
The design is within-subject as participants play all game. Due to concerns about game order effects, I randomize order of the 3 games resulting in 6 combinations of game orders. The game orders are randomized at the experimental session level.
Clusters
500 individuals
Observations
500 individuals
Arms
If there are substantial game order effects, we might use only the data from the first game played, effectively changing the design into between subject design. In this case, there would be 3 arms and so effectively approximately 166 subjects by treatment arm.
Primary outcomes
Transfers promised, for each possible set of income (and, in effort observable game, efforts). Effort, defined as whether or not the participant completes the task and the number of correct answers in the task.

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Prachi Jain, Imperfect monitoring and informal insurance: The role of social ties, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 180, 2020, Pages 241-256, ISSN 0167-2681, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.028. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.028

Cited by

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Keywords