The Antecedents to CEO Political Stances
How to cite
Rooney, Patrick. 2020. "The Antecedents to CEO Political Stances." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0006037. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6037-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
What factors lead CEOs to take political stances as part of a business strategy? Prior research has found that CEO political stances have strategic implications for stakeholders (such as workers and consumers), while politically motivated social agitation from outside groups can impact board departures. In this study, I plan on running a lab-in-the-field experiment examining the role of personal profits, cause-CEO value alignment, and sustained stakeholder pushback on participants’ willingness to take a costly political stand as part of a business strategy. This project aims to contribute causal antecedents to literature on the strategic implications of CEO sociopolitical stances.
Intervention
This intervention involves the impact of cause-participant values alignment and stakeholder pushback on participants' decision to take a costly political stance for a cause as part of a business strategy.
Experimental design
This experimental project will consist of two studies run with American participants on Prolific.
The first study will examine the impact of cause-participant values alignment on stand-taking. Stance taking is operationalized as a costly donation from the participant's period earnings to the cause (10% of period earnings). I will recruit equal numbers of American liberals and conservatives who will be randomly assigned to one of three political causes: a social liberal cause (Everytown for Gun Safety), a social conservative cause (the National Rifle Association), and an apolitical cause (the American Red Cross). This experiment, therefore, will have 6 randomized cells. At the beginning of the game, participants will be shown one reference point of personal earnings they could make from not taking a stance. Participants will then play 5 periods of a game in which they will vary the production inputs (including political stances), each of which is associated with a personal earnings value. After 5 periods, participants will be shown a reference point of personal earnings they could make from taking a stance; this earnings reference point is roughly 20% higher than the original, no-stance reference point. Participants will complete 5 more periods, be asked a short questionnaire on demographics, ethics, and beliefs, and will be paid from two randomly chosen periods (one from the first 5 periods, one from the second 5 periods). The show-up fee (i.e., payment floor) is $3.00. Participants will be paid any extra money they earn above $3.00 as bonus. The experiment will take roughly 15 minutes to complete.
The second study will be identical to the first except for two changes. First, the experiment will add a "reputation penalty", in which prospective participant earnings from strategies where they do not take a stand are reduced by $0.50 for each previous period in which they took a stand. This penalty is meant to approximate reputation penalties from stakeholders who able to punish the firm when the firm attempts to "reverse" their stance. Second, this study will only recruit American liberals (due to a lack of predicted differences between the political groups using the treatment).
Design details
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