Trust in State Authority and Non-State Actors
How to cite
Khwaja, Asim; Cheema, Ali; Robinson, James A.; Acemoglu, Daron. 2015. "Trust in State Authority and Non-State Actors." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000602. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.602-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The ability of the state to maintain trust with its citizens is a challenge in emerging economies. The proposed study examines how perceptions of relative state effectiveness determine a citizen's engagement with state and non-state actors. The first component of the study introduces a range of "exposure treatments" to individuals in Pakistan, a country that offers an excellent study context. The treatments vary from information provision about state and non-state initiatives versus a placebo information treatment. The study tests whether these interventions change a citizens' beliefs and attitudes towards state and non-state actors.
The second component of the study will offer several levels of intensity of treatment -- from pure information, to demonstration, to facilitating access to state services. We will then measure the change in citizens' beliefs and attitudes along with impacts on the citizens’ actual engagement with each actor. These ideas raise the possibility of a two-way feedback between the effectiveness of the state and citizens' attitudes towards it.
Intervention
The proposed research builds upon our pilot study (MIT Subaward Agreement No. 5710003). The two aims of the pilot were: (i) Developing effective information treatments; and (ii) Identifying feasible and appropriate services and target populations. We have now successfully developed and tested information treatments. Results from over 200 representative urban and rural respondents show that specific (accurate) positive informational primes on state actors do lead to positively (negatively) updating towards the state (non-state) actor. These results hold across subjective survey and experimental game outcomes. In addition, we have identified dispute resolution as a service where non-state actors are playing increasingly important roles and pose direct challenges to state authority. This has helped us develop specific "exposure treatments" pertinent to dispute resolution, establish partnerships with relevant players, and identify individuals at initial stages of a dispute, thus allowing us to measure the impact of the interventions on actual engagement in addition to survey and experimental outcomes.
Specifically, we propose to introduce three types of "exposure treatments" about dispute resolution services at the individual level. These treatments will vary in intensity from low to medium to high (from simple information provision about changes in effectiveness of the actor to real experiences with changed services). We examine how moving from low to high intensity treatments will impact beliefs about state (non-state) actors and movement away from non-state (state) options for dispute resolution. We will also study whether actual citizen engagement varies with the strength of exposure. Within each treatment type we also hope to introduce further variants that will shed light on when and why movements to state/non-state actors occur. We begin by discussing service and partner identification, move to sample identification, elaborate on the specific treatments in the study and then outline our data and methodology.
Experimental design
Respondents will participate in a field-based experiment to examine the effects of information treatments, which provide fact-based information on the behavior and ideology of state actors, on the level of trust and respect citizens hold for these state actors. The intent of the games is to identify the influences on citizens’ trust in state and non-state actors. They are being developed based on common behavioral trust games that ask respondents to make a monetary allocation with a given amount to various state and non-state actors. The experiment measures the change in their allocations given more positive or negative information relating to various the actors. Surveys will also be designed to gather more specifics in terms of the reasons for the allocation decisions of the players and also of perceptions of service provision by state and non-state actors. A double-blind design will ensure that allocation decisions cannot be traced back to each individual and that state and non-state counterparts will not have any knowledge of the identity of the respondents.
The study will recruit individuals through door-to-door household visits, use of land records system and lists of callers into the police helpline system as part of the study population to be given one of the three treatments or assigned to the control group. These systems are further explained below.
Along with the information treatment, two other treatments will be introduced to reduce barriers to accessing newly developed state services for respondents. These treatments are added to understand how additional exposure, not just information, to the state affects perceptions of state and non-state actors.
The second treatment will move beyond delivering simple information to making it more credible and persuasive by detailing new services—namely a computerized land record system and the police emergency helpline system—and educating respondents about accessing them. The computerized land registration management information system (LRMIS) in Punjab puts in place a reliable, efficient, and transparent system for maintaining land records. The system records all transactions and provides access to these records for the relevant population at designated service centers. The crime reporting helpline system by the police can be used during periods of emergency, threat or victimization. This system has been prevalent in Western countries for several decades (i.e. “911” service in the U.S. and Canada). The main component of this intervention, the helpline, will record all citizen complaints and direct designated police officers to respond to these complaints. In visits to respondents, we will explain step-by-step all processes associated with availing these services and how beneficial they have been to others. The first treatment consists of purely information about state or non-state actors (as was done in the first stage of the intervention). In contrast to the first treatment, this treatment seeks to engage the respondents via direct demonstration of new and positive services. In the case of land record system, we will demonstrate the system on a tablet but will recommend respondents visit service centers to further engage with the system.
The third treatment will directly reduce the transaction costs of engaging with state dispute resolution services. Specifically, we will offer "legal triage" to respondents. Initial evidence through the police helpline system shows calls with requests for legal advice. Our discussions with lawyers also suggest that such services would be of help and reduce the costs of accessing often burdensome state services. Trained professionals will develop a guidebook that will discuss resolution options for common types of cases and law students and/or paralegals will be trained and made available to assist respondents with their cases. While we haven't finalized the delivery logistics, options being considered include vouchers for consultation hours or a series of household visits by professionals. With respondents in all three treatments and a control group, we will collect data on perception of state and non-state actors, results of behavioral game play and use of state and non-state services. Additional surveys will be developed to be used at baseline and endline of these interventions. These documents will be added as an amendment when they are finished being prepared.
Details of Game Format
Two games that will be primarily used to test changes in perceptions of trustworthiness of state and non-state actors when given information treatments include the fund dictator game and the investment game.
Fund Dictator Game: Individuals are told that a given state or non-state actor has put an unknown portion of a given amount in a sealed envelope. The game allows participating individuals to make a choice between a fixed amount and this envelope given by the state or non-state actor.
Investment Game:
This allows participants to anonymously and confidentially invest some, or, or none of a specified amount representing their day’s income in a hypothetical scheme run by a type of state or non-state actors, knowing that their return is based on a measure of the actors’ effectiveness.
Design details
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